Air Force Institute of Technology

AFIT Scholar
Theses and Dissertations

Student Graduate Works

3-21-2008

Suspicion Modeling in Support of Cyber-Influence Operations/
Tactics
Henry G. Paguirigan

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.afit.edu/etd
Part of the Information Security Commons

Recommended Citation
Paguirigan, Henry G., "Suspicion Modeling in Support of Cyber-Influence Operations/Tactics" (2008).
Theses and Dissertations. 2861.
https://scholar.afit.edu/etd/2861

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Graduate Works at AFIT Scholar. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of AFIT Scholar. For more
information, please contact richard.mansfield@afit.edu.

SUSPICION MODELING IN SUPPORT OF CYBER-INFLUENCE
OPERATIONS/TACTICS

THESIS
Henry G. Paguirigan
Captain, USAF

AFIT/GIR/ENV/08-M17
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
AIR UNIVERSITY

AIR FORCE INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio
APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED

The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official
policy or position of the United States Air Force, Department of Defense, or the United
States Government.

AFIT/GIR/ENV/08-M17

SUSPICION MODELING IN SUPPORT OF CYBER-INFLUENCE
OPERATIONS/TACTICS

THESIS

Presented to the Faculty
Department of Systems and Engineering Management
Graduate School of Engineering and Management
Air Force Institute of Technology
Air University
Air Education and Training Command
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the
Degree of Master of Science in Information Resources Management

Henry G. Paguirigan, BSOE
Captain, USAF

March 2008
APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED

AFIT/GIR/ENV/08-M17
SUSPICION MODELING IN SUPPORT OF CYBER-INFLUENCE
OPERATIONS/TACTICS

Henry G. Paguirigan
Captain, USAF

Approved:

_____
//SIGNED//______________
Jason M. Turner, Maj, USAF, PhD (Chairman)

___21 Mar 08_____
Date

____________//SIGNED//________________
Michael R. Grimaila, PhD (Member)

___18 Mar 08_____
Date

AFIT/GIR/ENV/08-M17

Abstract

Understanding the cognitive process of IT user suspicion may assist organizations
in development of network protection plans, personnel training, and tools necessary to
identify and mitigate nefarious intrusions of IT systems. Exploration of a conceptual
common ground between pycho-social and technology-related concepts of suspicion are
the heart of this investigation. The complexities involved in merging these perspectives
led to the overall research question: What is the nature of user suspicion toward IT? The
research problem/phenomenon was addressed via extensive literature review, and use of
the Interactive Qualitative Analysis methodology. A focus group consisting of military IT
professionals identified their representative system of the problem/phenomenon. Analysis
of the system led to the development of a model of IT suspicion as a progenitor for future
experimental constructs that measure or assess behavior as a result of cyber attacks.
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SUSPICION MODELING IN SUPPORT OF CYBER-INFLUENCE
OPERATIONS/TACTICS
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
Background
Technological advances such as the personal computer and Internet have
revolutionized the way people communicate and have enabled users to swiftly and
reliably transmit large amounts of information worldwide. The diffusion of these and
other related technologies has been embraced, to a large extent, by the global community.
The more generalized term “information technology” (IT) has come to describe the
various incarnations of such technological advances and includes “any communications
device or computer, its ancillary equipment, software applications, and related supporting
resources” (AFDD 2-5, 2005, p. 52). IT is used increasingly for academic, business,
personal, government, and military purposes. In effect, IT has become a common tool in
everyday life for users in rich and poor countries alike (The Economist, 2007).
This global proliferation of IT has increased the number of interactions between
humans and technology. According to Bonito, Burgoon, Bengtsson (1999), interpersonal
interactions are subject to certain expectations that a person confers on the other. For
example each member of a group is expected to make useful (positive) contributions
toward a group goal; however, members of a group can also expect extraneous (negative)
contributions toward a group goal from other group members. These expectations
influence the nature of the social interaction as each member forms impressions on other
members. A negative impression may influence a member to question another member’s
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ability to contribute toward a task; hence affecting a member’s decision to trust the other.
The role of expectations in human-to-technology interactions is equally as valuable as
such expectations provide a basis for evaluation of task accomplishment and behavior of
the technology. We expect our technology to be dependable and secure, which provides
us the ability to know how a technology will behave (Flechais, Riegelsberger, and Sasse,
2006). A perceived violation of such expectations may arouse suspicion…suspicion
which might prompt a person to reevaluate the interaction or the technology itself –
leading to a decision to trust or distrust the technology. Given the notoriety and
popularization of notions such as hacker attacks or identity theft, it is reasonable to
conclude that many people have good reason to be suspicious of technology. Yet despite
the potential for such suspicions, modern life is marked by an ever-increasing
dependence on IT, even in the military.
The criticality of IT is especially evident in the DoD’s transformation into a
“network-centric” force – a force using network, information, and Internet-like
technologies to allow users to create and share information anywhere in the operational
battlespace (DoD CIO, 2005). The US military’s current approach toward such
transformation is to exploit IT as an enabler for the strategic success of current and future
operations and to gain information superiority. Information superiority is defined as
“…the capability to collect, process, and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of
information while exploiting or denying an adversary’s ability to do the same” (JV 2020,
2000, p. 8). For example, today’s military missions rely heavily on information for joint
operations. Such operations require the rapid collection of information, which, when
converted to useful knowledge, translates into superior battlespace awareness and better
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and faster decisions by commanders. IT allows the military (as well as other
organizations) to share, transmit, or store information, and integrate that information into
the decision-making process in an accurate and timely manner.
The significance of this integration and achieving information superiority is to
ensure a definitive competitive advantage of the military over its adversaries. This
competitive advantage manifests itself in the form of decision superiority. Joint Vision
2020 (2000) describes decision superiority as the critical ability of the military to take
advantage of information and convert it to superior knowledge. Air Force Doctrine
Document 2-5 (2005) also defines decision superiority in terms of “…improving our
ability to observe, orient, decide, and act (the OODA loop) faster and more effectively
than the adversary” (p. 1). The key to effectively managing the OODA loop is in
realizing that whoever progresses through this cycle more swiftly and acts more rapidly
than the adversary can “get inside” the opponent’s decision cycle to gain a military
advantage (Gibb, 2000).
The information environment is one in which humans and information
technologies interact regularly; the OODA loop is also executed within this environment
as a primary means of decision making (JP 3-13, 2006). The information environment
consists of three dimensions: cognitive, information, and physical. Of these three
dimensions, the cognitive dimension is the area in which people think, perceive,
visualize, and decide, “…it is the most important of the three dimensions” (JP 3-13, 2006,
p. I-2). It is also the dimension in which suspicion of IT plays a critical role, for while
technological advancements and IT enable the exchange of vast amounts of information,
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perceptions of that IT may affect how successfully the information shared, transmitted, or
stored using IT is ultimately applied to our decision making process.
For instance, suspicion arousal may hamper the fluidity of a military operation by
creating an obstacle as a result of acting on the perceived suspicion. For example, a
commander who becomes too suspicious to act on IT-founded intelligence, may end up
wasting valuable time getting HUMINT to confirm what sensor data had already
suggested was true). Thus, a potential conflict has developed between the military’s
reliance upon IT and the ways in which potential suspicion of IT could mitigate how
effectively such technologies can be used to enable military operations.
Regrettably, the more the military relies on IT as an enabler for its operations and
decisions, the more vulnerable our operations and decision-making abilities may become.
For example, our adversaries have long recognized the US military’s reliance on
information technology (Hebert, 2005). Thus, the perceived advantage IT confers on the
US military can also be a source of potential disadvantage as emerging technologies
introduces new vulnerabilities (AFDD 2-5, 2005). For this reason, information security
has become critical to military operations and the integrity of the OODA loop.
Information security is “The protection of information and information systems against
unauthorized access or modification, whether in storage, processing, or transit, and
against denial of service to authorized users” (JP 3-13, 2006, p. GL-9).
Information security vulnerabilities are those information systems and resources
that are susceptible to attacks from adversaries. For example in 1997, an NSA-led team of
hackers launched a successful attack on supposedly secure Pentagon computer networks
(Hebert, 2005). What was extremely disturbing about this attack is the fact that publicly
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available computer equipment and hacking software were used to infiltrate and take over
several US Pacific Command computers and emergency systems in major cities.
Many of the details of the NSA-led exercise, code-named “Eligible Receiver,” are
still classified; however, this in-house exercise highlights what may be very real
examples of our adversaries’ capabilities. Indeed, there have been numerous attempts to
access US technology and information, a third of which were traced to foreign entities
(US GAO, 2004). For example, hackers traced to servers in China had inserted a virus
into the US Department of Commerce’s information system. This attack resulted in the
replacement of hundreds of computers resulting in costly repairs and loss of productivity
(Roberts, 2006). The Air Force Personnel Center was also successfully attacked by an
unidentified perpetrator who hacked into the Assignment Management System database
and retrieved names, birth dates, and social security numbers of over 30,000 personnel,
hence making many in the Air Force potential targets for identity theft (Hebert, 2005).
Clearly, the military’s reliance on IT creates a number of potential vectors for
attack that could be costly in terms of money, mission accomplishment, even lives. With
that in mind, it is imperative that military personnel remain vigilant, especially those,
such as computer users, who are in direct contact with the technologies used to access
and manipulate elements of the information environment. In this sense, the notion of
suspicion in IT may actually serve as a source of strategic advantage because the
vigilance required to help guard against IT-based attacks and ensure a degree of
information security may also have its roots in IT suspicion-related issues. For example, a
person generally suspicious of IT while using a computer may be more likely to act on a
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perceived suspicion and detect a potentially harmful deceptive adversarial operation than
a person who is not generally suspicious of IT.
Research Focus
As the reliance on IT in the military increases, so do the vulnerabilities and
threats. As USAF Lt. Gen. C. Robert Kehler, STRATCOM’s Deputy Commander,
recently said, “The more the military comes to rely on network-based operations, the
more it must defend those networks” (Hebert, 2005, p. 65). However, there are important
processes happening in the minds of IT users that could mitigate network attacks, or at
least make IT users more sensitive to such attacks when they happen. Such processes
occur in the cognitive dimension of the information environment – a realm that has
primarily been studied and associated with the field of psychology (Hebert, 2005). As
such, the cognitive dimension is the dimension in which people think, perceive, visualize,
and decide (JP 3-13, 2006). One such process occurring within this dimension is that of
suspicion – a process that may be key to alerting users of potential attacks or
compromises in the IT-based elements of the information environment.
The notion of suspicion towards IT per se has not received a great deal of direct
attention and study, at least not enough to provide an explicit definition and conceptual
model that would be useful within military operational or training contexts. Specifically,
the existing research on suspicion has been predominantly conceptualized only in terms
of interpersonal relationships and social interactions. Within the technology-related
literatures, there are relatively few discussions of suspicion; however, there are
discussions of similar or related concepts such as trust and deception detection. The need

6

to establish some conceptually common ground between these many perspectives is at the
heart of the current investigation. Indeed, as Grabner-Kräuter, Kaluscha, and Fladnitzer
(2006) note, “In order to make progress in a scientific field, scholars need to find a
consistent terminology to be able to adequately test their hypotheses, to communicate
their results among each other and to build on each others findings” (pg. 1).
With this notion of consistent terminology in mind, the existing literature’s
treatment of user suspicion toward IT using associated or related concepts may be
missing something fundamental, or at least something that stands in the way of enabling
progress due to the lack of a consistent definition and conceptualization of suspicion
towards IT. Perhaps such a definition might even be informed by the aforementioned
research and focus on the interpersonal aspects of suspicion. For this reason, a
consideration of both the interpersonal and technology-related literature streams and
perspectives on suspicion and suspicion-related constructs seems appropriate for
developing a better understanding of what suspicion towards IT is (or might be).
Therefore, relevant literature streams from both psycho-social and IT-related fields of
study will be presented in the following sections such that it becomes clear that suspicion
towards IT may be more complex than previously thought (or modeled). It is these
complexities that are of interest throughout the remainder of this study and ultimately
inform the overall research question at the heart of this investigation: What is the nature
of user suspicion toward IT?
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Research Impact
The results of this study may provide a framework for others to build upon;
possibly for the creation of an IT suspicion-model which could be acted upon by any
organization that must protect its information technologies and systems from adversarial
attack. A suspicion-modeling system could also be beneficial for the detection of
technology-based deception (DeRosis, Castelfranchi, Carofiglio, 2000); specifically
helping to train IT users to detect such deception, as well as helping to develop the tools
necessary to identify and thwart information technology and systems attacks. From an
offensive standpoint, a better understanding of IT suspicion could facilitate the
development of IW attack tools and strategies. For instance, imagine if IW attacks were
conducted such that they did not raise adversarial suspicion, or at least raise that
suspicion to a level high enough to prompt an adversary to take action and ultimately
thwart an IW operation? The following chapter will explore the nature of suspicion and
its various incarnations and variations in both interpersonal and technology-related
contexts before the specific methodology used to address the overarching research
question will be presented.
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW

Interpersonal Perspectives
To explore the nature of user suspicion toward IT, it is appropriate to first explore
the nature of the foundational construct of interest: suspicion. As mentioned in the
previous chapter, suspicion per se has traditionally and more explicitly been addressed
within interpersonal contexts. Thus, the present discussion will also begin with an
examination of suspicion grounded in the interpersonal literatures before turning to
discussions of suspicion, and suspicion-related concepts, from more technology-centric
or technology-specific perspectives.
Suspicion
Several definitions of suspicion have been proposed in the interpersonal literature.
For example:
•

Deutsch (1958) defines suspicion from the aspects of expectations (anticipation of
behavior) and motivational relevance (positive or negative affect on a person’s
interests). A person becomes suspicious if his/her expectations are not met and the
behavior results in a negative motivational consequence to that person.

•

Kee and Knox (1970) defined suspicion in terms of a person’s uncertainty of
another person’s trustworthiness.

•

Fein, Hilton, and Miller (1990) define suspicion as “a dynamic state in
which the individual actively entertains multiple, plausibly rival
hypotheses about the motives or authenticity of a person’s behavior” (p.
1165).
9

•

Hubbell, Mitchell, and Gee (2001) define suspicion as a negative expectation of a
perceiver based upon inferences made about an actor as a result of information
that the perceiver has been given.
While each of these definitions may capture the essence of suspicion in a variety

of contexts, there are common elements. First, the overarching element is the notion that
suspicion is an active process or what Fein (1996) refers to as “the psychological state of
suspicion.” (p. 1164); a person makes a cognitive effort to ascertain the “reality” of a
person’s motives and behaviors. Second, suspicion is a negative expectation and an
uncertainty regarding another’s motives and attributed behavior, both of which are
considered within the suspicion process. Finally, these definitions suggest that suspicion
is a multifaceted process with a beginning, where suspicion is generated; middle, where a
suspended judgment exists; and an end, where an actor’s true motives and behavior are
ascertained. To fully understand suspicion one must therefore examine the process of
suspicion from beginning to end.
The “Process of Suspicion”
Generating Suspicion
The process of suspicion begins as a result of any of a number of factors. The
generation of suspicion is marked by the point at which a person is aroused by a
particular event or induced to become suspicious. This condition is a situation-dependent
arousal or “state suspicion” (Levine and McCornack, 1991) defined as “a belief that
communication within a specific setting and at a particular time may be deceptive” (Ibid.,
p. 328). For example, the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) Game has been used in research to

10

study cooperative behavior (Deutsch, 1958). The PD game involves participants who
each must make one of two choices: a cooperative choice, which offers the best outcome
for each player, with little payoff for all players; or a competitive choice, which offers the
greatest outcome to one player, but severe detrimental loss to the others. The issue was
whether or not a player would exploit the other’s generosity in the hopes that he will gain
the most benefit, regardless of the consequences to the other player. Therefore, each
player’s decision to cooperate or compete was based on uncertainty of the other player’s
motivations. Hence, the rules of the game are such that each player is suspicious of other
player’s motives. Similarly, a salesman who is supposedly providing the “best deal” he
can is more likely to be concerned with getting a higher commission on the sale than the
welfare of the consumer. As a consumer, the “nature of the game” therefore naturally
implies that the salesman’s motivations are automatically suspect. Both scenarios are
examples of situations in which suspicion is implicitly induced prior to an interaction.
Hubbell et al. (2001) found timing of aroused suspicion affects subsequent
cognitive processing. Specifically, suspicion arousal prior to an interaction resulted in a
higher initial suspicion, than those who were not aroused prior to an interaction.
However, according to Stiff, Kim, and Ramesh (1992), it is unlikely for people to become
suspicious on their own; instead, third-party information can arouse suspicion. This
aroused suspicion could also be reduced or increased by further interaction with the actor,
or another party. In general, such arousal prior to or at an initial interaction is often high
enough to influence the decisions made within the suspicion process that ensues.
Suspicion could also be the result of a predisposition referred to as a generalized
communicative suspicion (GCS). According to Levine and McCornack (1991), GCS is an
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inherent belief that all incoming communication behaviors from others are deceptive.
Although not all people are predisposed to make this generalization, this particular type
of suspicion is not situationally-dependent as was state suspicion. Both state suspicion
and GCS are precursory to any cognitive processing judgment about a particular
message. However, people who are predisposed to GCS are more astute in the subsequent
cognitive processing judgment, than individuals who are not predisposed to GCS.
Therefore, the concepts of state suspicion and GCS should not be overlooked as relevant
independent variables in suspicion-related research (Ibid.).
A person may also become suspicious when an expectation is not met. An
expectation is a person’s preconception that an actor will behave according to the
inferences made by that person or as a result of information about that actor (Hubbell et
al., 2001). McCornack and Parks (1986) found as a relationship develops partners tend to
become less discerning of each other’s behaviors and begin to generalize their
expectations of each other. Hence, as relational development increases the level of
uncertainty of each partner decreases (Ibid.). Deutsch (1958) viewed such expectations as
anticipated behaviors that were indicative of a person’s underlying motives or rationale
for action. For example, if a person trusts another to carry out a relatively simple task,
that person’s expectation is that the task will be accomplished. However, if the task is not
completed, the trusting person loses confidence in the other person and therefore
becomes suspicious as to why the other person was unable to complete the task. The
trusting person may begin to question and attribute this failure to not only a person’s
efficacy, but possibly to the other person’s motivations.

12

Finally, suspicion may occur as a result of dispositional inferences made about
another person even when an opposing explanation is provided (Fein et al., 1990). A
person makes a dispositional inference when that person judges another based solely on
the behavior of the other person, without regards to the situation or the environment that
may have caused the behavior. In other words, an observer may note that another person
looks or behaves in such a way that triggers suspicion, even though an explanation is
provided that contradicts the inferred behavior. For example, a woman drops her books
and a man stops to help her pick them up. An external observer may conclude a situation
in which a person is helping another in a time of distress. However, if the woman was
young and pretty, and the man and woman are not married (as assumed by the lack of a
ring on his and her finger), then the external observer may suspect that the man had an
ulterior motive. Perhaps the man’s deed was not sincere, but an attempt to meet a pretty
woman. What if the woman wasn’t pretty? Would the man have behaved as he did?
People who typically make dispositional inferences based on their observations of
others may be misled by ignoring the environment or situation – referred to as the
fundamental attribution error (Ross, 1977) or correspondence bias (Gilbert and Jones,
1986). Although this may not be a valid way to determine another person’s true motives,
it does provide a relatively practical and initial justification as to what that person’s
behavior represents. Thus, to ensure the validity of one’s dispositional inference of
another person’s behavior, an active cognitive process ensues that takes into account the
situation (Fein, 1996) – an important part of the next step in the suspicion process –
maintaining suspicion.
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Maintaining Suspicion
As suggested thus far, initial suspicion may be attributed to several factors;
however, once suspicion is initiated, there is an intricate and associated sub-process left
to run its course. Whether suspicion is a result of situational arousal, GCS, unfulfilled
expectation, or dispositional inference, the next stage of suspicion generally involves a
person’s attempts to confirm an actor’s behavior or motives underlying the observed
behavior. According to Fein (1996), a suspicious person uses a more active method of
cognitive processing (as opposed to an unsuspicious person) used to ascertain a person’s
behavior or ulterior motives. This intense cognitive processing is what Fein (1996) refers
to as a psychological state of suspicion or “suspended judgment.” The bulk of the
suspicion process is consumed by this suspended judgment and it may become an
enduring step because a person may remain in a suspicious state due to the cognitive
complexities involved in the attempts to determine an actor’s true motives and behavior.
Perhaps the best representation used to model this process of suspended judgment
(Fein, et al., 1990; Hilton, Fein, and Miller, 1993; Fein, 1996) is the person- (or social-)
perception construct developed by Gilbert, Pelham, and Krull (1988). The construct
consists of three sequential stages (Ibid, p. 374):
(a) Categorization (i.e., identifying actions);
(b) Characterization (i.e., drawing dispositional inferences about the actor);
(c) Correction (i.e., adjusting those inferences with information about situational
constraints).
The three-stage construct begins with categorization, which Gilbert et al. (1988)
considers a simple and relatively routine process that devotes little cognitive effort.
Categorization is essentially an observation made that is obvious, such as “We see Henry
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playing poker rather than simply moving his fingers, Herbert cheating rather then simply
taking a card from his sleeve” (Ibid., p. 734). According to Trope (1989, p. 302), “In
everyday life, task demands and the perceiver’s own goals frequently require the use of
the immediate behavior to predict how the actor will act toward other objects in different
occasions and circumstances.”
Although categorization is discussed in this step of the suspicion process,
identifying a behavior is typically done prior to a suspended judgment. Trope (1989)
suggests the identification of a behavior or situation is prior to making a dispositional
inference. Categorization may be a means to provide an immediate judgment at the onset
of a social interaction; however, the evaluation does not necessarily stop there. According
to Hilton, et al. (1993), categorization is an initial acceptance of an observed behavior,
but then a person follows it up by making a dispositional inference about another
person’s behavior and taking into account conceived situational variables (i.e.,
characterization). Because categorization is a simple process of identifying a behavior, it
is relatively quick and not cognitively demanding – as opposed to the subsequent
processes of characterization and correction.
The next step in the three-stage process is characterization. Gilbert (1991) found
that the components of believing in something perceived (i.e., an object, person, action,
self), a person must first identify (categorization), and then make an evaluation of that
perception (characterization). A distinction between higher (active processing) and lower
(passive processing) orders of reasoning was posited by Gilbert et al. (1988), such that
“One passively has a perception, whereas one actively draws an inference” (p. 743). It
follows that suspicion is not simply a result of a person’s perception of another, but it
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also includes an inference of some kind. Fein (1996) posits that suspicion produces active
perceivers who are reluctant to make quick characterizations about an inferred behavior.
Thus, the author suggests characterization is not automatic in suspicious perceivers;
instead, one must apply certain inferential rules to achieve a state of characterization.
One such inferential rule is the anchoring principle (Tversky and Kahneman,
1974; Quattrone, 1982). An initial assessment presents an “anchor” for making any
adjustments to subsequent judgments; however, the anchor may also change as a result of
an active perceiver’s reevaluation of the characterization stage (Gilbert et al, 1988. For
example, a perceiver notices a person using a modified coat hanger to break into a car
(e.g., categorization) and makes an inferred judgment (e.g., characterization) that this is
an attempt to steal the car or any belongings in it (e.g., the anchor). However, further
observation yields the person does not look like a criminal (based on his knowledge,
experience, and perception); therefore, he decides the person simply locked his keys in
the car (e.g., adjustment to the anchor). On the contrary, the perceiver observes the
person hurriedly get into the car and speed away. The perceiver again adjusts his
judgment to reflect the original anchoring judgment as true.
The aforementioned characterization stage provides an assessment that could lead
to a confirmation or disconfirmation of suspicion, or lead one to remain in a state of
suspended judgment until more information is made available to substantiate an ultimate
verdict (Hilton et al., 1993). The correction stage is where much of the cognitive
resources are devoted as a person reevaluates multiple hypotheses, situational factors, and
other information that supports correction or adjustment of the initial characterization
(i.e., interpretation of the inferred behavior). This seemingly unremitting process, which

16

may vacillate between the stages of characterization and correction, requires a conscious
and deliberate effort in order to come to an accurate response (Fein, 1996). For example,
returning to the aforementioned scenario of the person breaking into a car, the perceiver
decides to take into account the situation. The perceiver realizes the person may have
been late for an appointment as a result of locking his keys in the car and spending a
significant amount of time trying to break into it. Suspicious perceivers actively pursue
competing options and additional information toward a salient confirmation of the
dispositional inference, while taking into account situational factors, and therefore reduce
the chances of a correspondence bias (Fein, 1996).
Concluding Suspicion
Finally, suspicion ends when a person no longer questions an actor’s motives and
behavior because a determination has already been made. Marchand and Vonk (2005, p.
251) state that “suspicion is a dynamic process that unfolds over time as people grapple
with the possibility that an actor has ulterior motives, and then become convinced.” The
authors also suggest that the speed of the suspicion process may be affected by individual
personalities. For example, people who have a high “need for closure may be quicker to
jump through the process and conclude that an actor is insincere” (Ibid., p 254). The
process involves a wealth of cognitive resources as a result of attempting to find the truth
behind an actor’s behavior as described in the previous sections. Once the perceiver
arrives at a final judgment as a result of the suspicion process, suspicion ends because
there are no longer multiple, rival hypotheses. Exactly what is the nature of this final
judgment? As will be discussed in a section to follow; the process of suspicion ends when
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a perceiver ultimately arrives at a decision to trust or distrust; hereafter referred to as a
“trust-decision.” It is important to note that further mention of a “trust-decision” in this
study is synonymous with resolving the suspended judgment of the suspicion process.
Bias Effects on the Suspicion Process
The suspicion process is not free from certain biases that have a direct effect on
the process itself. The truth- and lie- biases affect the cognitive processing of the
characterization and correction stages within the three-stage suspicion process. Truth-bias
is a person’s inclination toward processing another person’s message as true (McCornack
and Parks, 1986). Stiff et al. (1992, p.328), suggested that the “truth bias represents a
default mode that guides the processing of relevant information.” According to Marchand
and Vonk (2005), some people are inclined to accept everything they see at face value. In
other words, when a person is provided information, whether it is from a third-party or
other indications, that person will accept such information as true. The truth-bias exists as
a result of well-developed relationships (Stiff et al., 1992). Findings have shown that as a
relationship develops, partners tend to believe in each other’s trustworthiness and rarely
question it (McCornack and Parks, 1986); therefore acceptance of trustworthiness, as a
result of the truth-bias will preclude the active characterization and correction stages of a
suspended judgment.
Unlike the truth-bias, the lie-bias is “a cognitive-processing bias toward decoding
all incoming messages as deceptive” (Levine and McCornack, 1991, p. 328). The
difference between lie-bias and GCS (previously mentioned under generation of
suspicion) is that GCS is based on beliefs that are inherent prior to making any judgment
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(or arduous cognitive effort) based upon information provided, whereas the lie-bias
involves the cognitive processing of information presented. Therefore, a person who is
predisposed to the lie-bias does not remain in a suspended judgment for long, if at all
(Ibid.). As a result of a biased processing suggesting all information as false, a person
will consequently and quickly validate his/her suspicion, due to his/her negative
perception of the target’s motives. Therefore, a lie–bias, like the truth-bias, affects the
process of suspicion by either expediting the suspended judgment or excluding the
suspended judgment altogether.
Trust
No discussion of suspicion would be complete without a discussion of trust. Trust
is a concept intimately related to its “darker cousin” – suspicion (McCornack and Levine,
1990, p. 219), because as proposed in the aforementioned suspicion discussion, a “trustdecision” is the end-state of the suspicion process. In fact, McCornack and Parks (1986)
suggest even a slight state of suspicion is helpful in making a trust-decision. In addition,
Marchand and Vonk (2005) propose “the process of suspicion may apply to any situation
in which a person’s behavior can be guided by multiple motives, thus causing perceivers
to hold multiple hypotheses, or doubt whether their initial judgment was correct” (p.
254). The concept and process of suspicion is a psychological state resulting from
situational, or outside influence, predispositions, expectations, certainty (or uncertainty),
or behavioral (dispositional) inferences, all which can be affected by biases. As will be
demonstrated in the following sections, so too is the notion of trust.
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Trust is a vital part of a wide range of relationships, from romantic
relationships to organizational relationships (Whitener, Brodt, Korsgaard, and
Werner, 1998). We place trust in our government, military, businesses, doctors,
babysitters, and so on. It is fundamental to social interactions in groups and at
work in hopes that everyone will contribute and cooperate in order to meet
established goals. We tend to trust because it is a necessary and desirable aspect
in our diverse interactions with others, and that if we did not trust, then we would
never know (Gambetta, 1988).
Trust is a complex concept with research that spans several disciplines –
psychology, sociology, philosophy, economics, organizational science and education
(Tschannen-Moran & Hoy, 2000). Due to the breadth of trust research amongst several
disciplines, each offering its own definition, confusion exists as to a single definition and
conceptualization of trust. For example:
•

Deutsch (1958) defines trust in terms of expectations (anticipation of behavior)
and motivational relevance (positive or negative affect on a person’s interests). A
person trusts another if his/her expectations are met and the behavior results in a
positive motivational consequence to that person.

•

Kee and Knox (1970) defined trust in terms of a person’s certainty of another
person’s trustworthiness.

•

Rotter (1971, p. 444) defined trust as “an expectancy held by an individual or a
group that the word, promise, verbal, or written statement of another individual or
group can be relied on.”
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•

Lewicki and Stevenson (1998, p. 439) defined trust as “confident positive
expectations regarding another’s conduct.”

•

Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, and Camerer (1998, p. 395) provided “Trust is a
psychological state comprising the intention to accept vulnerability based upon
positive expectations of the intentions or behavior of another.”
The “Elements of Trust”
Clearly, trust, like suspicion, is a multidimensional construct. Each of the

proposed definitions above provides contextual variations to the definition of trust;
however, it is interesting to note the similarities and recurrence of various elements of
suspicion within the proposed definitions of trust – elements such as situational and
outside influence, expectations, certainty (or uncertainty), and dispositional inferences.
Because of these similarities, it seems reasonable to conclude that the trust-decision is
somehow tied to the suspicion process…but how? Rousseau et al. (1998) conducted an
extensive multidisciplinary study of trust literature in order to come to a fundamental
conclusion of the concept of trust. The authors posited that a trust-decision is a dynamic,
rather than static process that changes over time (Ibid., p. 395). Thus, the suspicion
process and the process of making a trust-decision are astoundingly similar.
Similarities Between the Elements of Trust and Suspicion
Similar to the suspicion process, the trust process is also based on expectations,
certainty (or uncertainty), and dispositional inferences, all of which can be affected by
biases. For example, like suspicion, the term expectation or expectancy is used often in
defining trust. Deutsch (1958) suggests that expectations are anticipated behaviors and
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Rotter (1971) defined trust as an expectancy that others rely on to do or behave in a
dependable or trustworthy manner.
Both trust and suspicion include the element of expectations that support the
cognitive process of making a trust-decision. In fact, initial factors of suspicion somewhat
mirror initial trust-decisions, such that the confirmation or disconfirmation of trust (or
suspicion) relies on an initial assessment, which provides an anchor for adjusting
subsequent decisions (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974; Quattrone, 1982; Gilbert et al.,
1988). In other words, the three-stage construct used in the suspicion process:
categorization (i.e., identifying actions), characterization (i.e., drawing dispositional
inferences), and correction (adjusting those inferences), is the same process used in a
trust-decision.
According to Bottitta and Felici (2006, p. 1274), “people develop, over the course
of their lives, generalized expectations about the trustworthiness of other people.” A
person may make initial trust-decisions based on their individual perceptions of reality, as
a result of past experiences. This allows a person to generalize those experiences from
one person to another (Rotter, 1967). For example, children who grow up in an
environment where there is continuity and predictability in their care and other needs will
likely develop a sense of trust toward others (Kephart, 2004). Thus, generalized
expectations lead to predictability of another’s actions, which also reduces uncertainty
(e.g., the element of suspicion).
According to Lewicki, Tomlinson, and Gillespie (2006), trust is the positive
expectation (as opposed to a negative expectation that leads to suspicion) a person
expects from another despite uncertainty about another’s motives and behavior; however,
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as previously mentioned in this study, as relational development increases, the level of
uncertainty decreases (McCornack & Parks, 1986). Thus, relationship development
facilitates trust between partners as a result of a decrease in uncertainty of each other’s
motives and behavior. Therefore, the elements of certainty and uncertainty are
interrelated because a person must have a level of certainty in order to trust. A level of
certainty is essentially a degree of confidence one has in regards to the associated risk
involved with one’s expectations (Rousseau, et al., 1998). In other words, a decision to
trust is a willingness to become vulnerable to another, which poses a risk due to the
uncertainty of whether or not the other person will act appropriately (Rousseau, et al.,
1998; Hudson, 2004). According to Hudson (2004), if one were completely certain, trust
would not be necessary (such as if one was certain about another person’s intentions).
The general use of dispositional inferences is also the same in the process of
suspicion and making trust-decisions. Jones and George (1998) suggest that a person’s
trust involves a cognitive effort to give meaning to associated behaviors one observes
through social interactions. In other words, a dispositional inference is made that provides
a contextual definition of the social interaction, which then becomes a basis for a trustdecision. The role of dispositional inferences on making trust-decisions is quite common
in social interactions. According to Gilbert & Jones (1986), “people conceptualize
behavior as the product of an actor’s personal dispositions” (p. 269). Although making
dispositional inferences takes a certain level of cognitive processing, it is not, however,
the sole determinant of making a trust-decision (Quattrone, 1982; Trope, 1989). As
previously mentioned, dispositional inferences are part of the characterization stage of the
suspicion process, so too is it part of the trust process; however, both processes also
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involve a stage of correction. Together the characterization and correction processes are a
bulk of the cognitive processes of suspicion and trust.
The aforementioned discussion, suggests that Gilbert et al.’s (1988) threestage construct: categorization, characterization, and correction, is a cognitive
process used by both the suspicion and trust processes. Like the suspicion process,
the decision to trust requires a person to gain a certain amount of knowledge or
information to make that choice. According to McKnight, Cummings, and
Chervany (1998), cognitive processes allow individuals to gather information and
make initial judgments in order to form impressions of another person’s
trustworthiness. The initial trusting situation provides a foundational anchor to
test whether the trust-decision was valid and allows one to adjust accordingly
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1974; Quattrone, 1982; Gilbert et al., 1988). Hence, the
suspicion process, which involves a psychological or cognitive effort to determine
a person’s motives and behavior, is the same process involved in determining
another person’s trustworthiness.
Finally, trust may be situationally-dependent or influenced by a thirdparty. Lewis and Weigert (1985) stated, “We cognitively choose whom we will
trust in which respects and under which circumstances” (p. 970). However, trust
is not gullibility, although some people are prone to act in such a manner. Instead,
a decision to trust reflects experience in particular situations (Rotter, 1980). For
example, when a worker goes in for a job evaluation, he trusts his manager to give
him a good rating based on positive feelings about the interaction and past
evaluations that were rated high – a generalized expectation as a result of
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experience (Bottitta and Felici, 2006). Trust via third-party influence is also
dependent on experiences and expectations. One is willing to trust another based
on whether the other person has shown consistent acts of benevolence toward the
other (Whitener, Brodt, Korsgaard, and Werner, 1998).
Effects of Truth-Bias on Trust
As mentioned previously, the truth bias is a person’s inclination toward
processing another person’s message as true (McCornack and Parks, 1986). The effect of
the truth-bias on trust is the same as that on suspicion. Specifically, the fact that a person
is inclined to trust another without collecting additional information and processing it
objectively implies that the resulting trust-decision is biased and may not be correct. As
suggested by Stiff et al. (1992), the truth-bias is a product of well-developed
relationships. The authors suggest that increases in intimacy directly influence relational
partners’ ability to trust each other. Thus, the truth-bias skews a person’s ability to make
an accurate trust-decision (McCornack and Parks, 1986). Therefore, a person who is
truth-biased will likely make a presumptive trust judgment, without further consideration
of the possibility of another person’s ulterior motives or behavior. In other words, the
suspended judgment of the suspicion process (e.g., the process used to make a trustdecision) is bypassed.
Suspicion Prior to Trust
Discussion thus far has demonstrated significant overlap of the suspicion and
trust-decision processes, enough so that one may be led to assume that the processes are
concurrent or totally the same. However, this assumption is not entirely accurate because
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a person does not make a decision to be suspicious; rather the decision is whether to
“trust or distrust.” Simply put, the final outcome of a suspended judgment is a trustdecision, not a “suspicious-decision.” Thus, suspicion is ultimately the process that leads
a person to a trust-decision.
According to Jones and George (1998), “At the beginning of a social encounter,
each person does not simply assume that the other is trustworthy; rather, each suspends
belief that the other’s values may be different from their own – that the other may not be
trustworthy” (p. 535). Clearly, it is this “suspended belief” that is synonymous to the
“suspended judgment” of the suspicion process. Therefore, questioning another person’s
trustworthiness is, by definition, suspicion. It follows then that suspicion is an antecedent
condition or process to arriving at or rendering a trust-decision. Fein (1996) suggests that
a suspended judgment is necessary in order to avoid being “duped by another individual”
(p. 1166). However, one can only be “duped” if another person betrays one’s trust, such
as through an unfulfilled expectation that results in a negative consequence to the trusting
person. Therefore, in order to avoid what Rotter (1980) called “foolish trust” or
“gullibility” (p. 1), and to make a good trust-decision, a person must first engage in the
process of suspicion.
Deception
Though fraud [deception] in other activities may be detestable, in
the management of war it is laudable and glorious, and he who
overcomes the enemy by fraud is as much to be praised as he who
does so by force.


Nicollo Machiavelli, Discourses, 1517
(Source: JP 3-58, p. II-1)
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Trust and suspicion are clearly quite closely related concepts despite their stated
complexities. For instance, trust may influence how quickly we become suspicious of
others’ actions, and our suspicions may impact the degree to which we ultimately trust
others regardless of any additional information collected. Both perceptions may be
affected by various forms of bias that could result in inaccurate judgments. However,
there are other reasons why those judgments might fail us. For example, the object of our
judgments may be intentionally trying to manipulate, circumvent, or outright deceive our
various mechanisms and processes of suspicion and trust. What happens when the
mechanisms of suspicion and trust don’t lead us to the correct conclusions? What
conditions or reasons might lead us to draw such faulty conclusions? Additional insight
regarding the answers to these questions may be found in the pages of deception-based
literature and research.
Deception – The word itself conjures up thoughts of wicked acts, but deception
can actually be a good thing – depending on whether you are an instigator or receiver of
the deceptive action. Deception is defined as “a deliberative attempt to mislead others”
(DePaulo, Lindsay, Malone, Muhlbruck, Charlton, and Cooper, 2003) and “the
manipulation of appearances such that they convey a false reality” and “includes both
dissimulation (hiding or withholding information) and simulation (putting out wrong or
misleading information)” (Druckman and Bjork, 1991, p.172). From these definitions, it
follows that deception is not the same as lying, although it may include lying as a way to
mislead others. Elaad (2003, p. 349) suggested, “All human beings are engaged in
deception and are motivated to unfold the lies of other people.”
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Interpersonal Deception Theory
One of the more influential and well-cited theories in modern deception-related
thought and research is the Interpersonal Deception Theory (IDT) developed by Buller
and Burgoon (1996). The IDT is a robust theory within the interpersonal literature that
blends the notion of suspicion with the complexities of deception and deception
detection. The IDT is grounded in the idea that both sender and receiver of interpersonal
deceptive communication are active participants and a sender’s suspicion or trust has a
continuous influence on both the sender and receiver. According to Burgoon, Buller,
Ebesu, White, and Rockwell (1996, p. 258):
Receiver suspicion is linked to sender behavior; it is made manifest
through receivers’ communication behavior; it is noticeable to senders;
and its presence or the perception of it affects senders’ own
communicative behavior. Suspicion is thus a highly relevant element in
understanding deception in interactive contexts.
The roles of sender and receiver are similar to perceivers discussed in the
aforementioned suspicion and trust literatures. According to Burgoon et al. (1996), both
senders and receivers bring into a social interaction “goals, expectations, and sometimes
knowledge” relevant to the situation (p. 244). Behavioral inferences are made during this
interaction in which initial credibility judgments (e.g., evaluation of a person’s
trustworthiness) are ascertained. Like the suspicion process, this initial credibility
judgment serves as an anchor for subsequent adjustments. Adjustments to sender and
receiver behavior are made as more information is processed during the interaction
(Tversky and Kahneman, 1974; Quattrone, 1982; Gilbert et al., 1988; Burgoon et al.,
1996). For example, a receiver may adjust or reevaluate an initial credibility judgment,
manifested in a decision to trust or remain suspicious of a sender, as a result of
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informational cues provided by further social interaction with a sender. On the other
hand, a sender may also make adjustments to his/her own behavior as a result of
informational cues presented from a receiver during a social interaction in an attempt to
deceive (Burgoon et al., 1996). It follows that the suspicion process is inherent to the
IDT. As anchoring and adjusting are parts of the suspicion process, so too are they parts
of the IDT process conducted by both parties in an interaction.
Social interactions involve both sender and receiver attempts to identify
informational cues presented by the other. The goal of a receiver is to identify cues that
promote a trust-decision. In the context of deceptive communication, a receiver is
specifically looking for deceptive cues. A receiver may identify cues that may incite
suspicion leading to a verdict that a deceptive act is occurring or has occurred. For
example, Burgoon et al. (1996) states that “based on social norms and expectations,
greater unpleasantness and uninvolvement (e.g., nonimmediacy, inexpressiveness,
noncomposure, and poor conversation management) should provoke greater suspicion”
(p. 245). Thus, such cues are likely to take the form of any deviations from normal
pleasant conversation and the level of the other’s involvement in the interaction.
Senders have the daunting task of creating convincing messages through different
types of verbal and nonverbal cues and by manipulating information, while managing the
communication process (George and Carlson, 1999). Because senders are engaged in
simultaneous tasks of sending a deceptive message and monitoring for suspiciousness
from the target individual (DePaulo, et al., 2003) it is likely that leakage will occur.
Leakage refers to those indicators that signal to others deception is present (Buller &
Burgoon, 1996). However, receivers are also engaged in the dual task of discerning
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incoming messages while attempting to hide their own suspicion. Thus, leakage of cues
may come from both sender and receiver in attempts to deceive each other.
Indicators of deception, whether they are verbal or nonverbal, are considered
deception cues, as they do arouse suspicion. Zuckerman, DePaulo, and Rosenthal (1981)
conducted an extensive study on observable verbal and nonverbal deception cues. They
noted that nonverbal deception indicators included body movements, facial expressions,
and eye movements, whereas verbal indicators included voice inflections, such as pitch,
tone, and rate of speech. Receivers who are attuned to these cues have a good chance of
becoming suspicious, and therefore act on that behavior (McCornack and Parks, 1986;
Burgoon et al., 1996). However, according to Toris and DePaulo (1984), sender’s have an
advantage, because they are able to take a receiver’s responses to determine level of
success and adjust accordingly. Although receivers are aware of cues and may even have
detection strategies, receivers have the disadvantage of not knowing when a deceptive act
occurs.
Effect of Truth-Bias on Deception Detection
Just as the truth-bias can impact the process of suspicion or the perceptions of
trust; so too, can the truth-bias affect our ability to detect deception from others.
According to Millar and Millar (1997), studies have shown that accuracy of deception
detection is rarely over 60% and typically results in levels of chance. Zuckerman, Kernis,
Driver, and Koester (1984) suggest receivers affected by the truth-bias tend to accept a
sender’s message and anchor it by providing it an initial value from which adjustments
are made; however, making an adjustment when the deception is real results in an
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inaccurate trust judgment. The reason a person may accept this initial value may be a
result of a simplified decision process or heuristic (Stiff et al., 1992) that suggests that
most messages are truthful (McCornack and Parks, 1986). According to Stiff et al.
(1992), people who exhibit a strong truth-bias are involved in a “significantly less
cognitive involvement” (p. 340) in the process of discerning truth from deception, as
opposed to people who do not exhibit a truth-bias. Therefore, it seems reasonable to
conclude that a person predisposed to the truth-bias is less motivated, and thus, less likely
to search for deceptive cues that lead to detection.
Effects of Suspicion on Deception Detection
Clearly, the truth-bias negatively affects deception detection; however, according
to Stiff et al. (1992), suspicion helps to offset the use of this heuristic (p. 329). Thus, the
process of suspicion also has an influence on deception detection, in this case, a positive
influence. Stiff et al. (1992) found, regardless of relational development level, suspicion
is an important part of making a credibility judgment because suspicion leads to fewer
decisions to trust. Biros (1998) also posited suspicion arousal strongly impacts deception
detection ability, such as when a person is warned (e.g., via a third-party) prior to an
interaction. As mentioned previously, suspicion aroused prior to an interaction results in a
higher initial suspicion level than for those who are not aroused prior to an interaction,
thus leading to increased cognitive processing (Hubbell et al., 2001). Therefore, aroused
suspicion also causes perceivers to become more involved in the detection process
(Burgoon et al., 1996), essentially motivating a person to detect deception and thus
become more vigilant overall.
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Summary of Interpersonal Literature Review
Suspicion is clearly a complex and active psychological process in which a person
makes a cognitive effort to ascertain a person’s true motives and behavior in order to
come to a trust-decision (Fein, 1996). Both the suspicion and trust processes are a result
of situational, or outside influence, predispositions, expectations, certainty (or
uncertainty), or behavioral (dispositional) inferences, all which can be affected by biases.
Trust, like suspicion, involves cognitive processes that allow individuals to gather
information in order to make a judgment about another person. In addition, it has been
suggested within the pages of this analysis that suspicion is a state of indecision and that
a trust-decision is ultimately a decision made as result of that suspicion. Hence, suspicion
is the process that leads to trust, and trust itself is one potential result of the decision that
follows the process of suspicion.
Because deception is part of everyday life, and it is certainly important to those of
us in a military context, detection of deception is necessary in order to protect oneself
from being deceived by others. The importance of making a correct trust-decision via
suspicion (the process of resolving a suspended judgment) is important to the notion of
deception detection because it sides on the line of caution. Suspicion helps to eliminate
gullibility and the truth-bias, which can hinder social interactions and relational
development. However, both sender and receiver of deceptive messages are capable of
deceiving the other, as well as being deceived. Therefore, the mechanisms and processes
of suspicion, as well as one’s ability to manipulate those mechanisms and processes, are
critical to the identification of informational cues that are indicators of deception and
hence the decision to trust or distrust.
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Technological Perspectives
Discussion thus far has established the perceptual processes and mechanisms at
work in the interpersonal “version” of suspicion, and those of the very closely entwined
notions of trust and deception. However, we’re still left to wonder how technology
affects suspicion and trust; especially when the object of that suspicion and trust is no
longer another person, but the technology another person might be using to communicate
with others or simply the technology upon which critical information and processes may
be created, stored, transformed, executed, or manipulated. It is these questions that
inform the remainder of the literature review.
Although perceivers may be fooled by nonsocial objects, they are not
likely to suspect that these objects intended to behave in a particular
manner to convey fictitious or misleading information. Our curses to the
contrary, most of us realize that our computers do not intentionally crash
whenever they sense that we are under unusually great amounts of
pressure.
•

Fein (1996, p. 1164)

Human-Computer Interaction
The Association for Computing Machinery Special Interest Group on ComputerHuman Interaction (ACM SIGCHI), the world’s largest professional association of HCI
researchers, define HCI as “the design, evaluation, implementation, and study of
interactive computing systems for human use” (http://sigchi.org). The origin of HCI was
traditionally focused on “ease of use,” but today research goes beyond making a
computer user’s tasks easier or “user-friendly” and into the social aspects of the user such
as perceptions and expectations (Bradley, 1998; Binstock, 1999). Thus, HCI is much
more than designing computers to make it easier for people to accomplish certain tasks.
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HCI is just as much, or even more, concerned with the human user as it is with the
computing system.
According to Rozanski and Haake (2003), HCI provides a distinct point of view
to the IT field because HCI research is primarily focused on understanding the user rather
than the technology, “who they are, what they do, how and why they do things, and the
contexts in which they work” (p. 180). The authors suggest HCI is a multidisciplinary
field that includes disciplines such as cognitive and behavioral psychology, and
sociology, combining with computer science, engineering, and graphic design (p.181).
According to Binstock (1999), “Disciplines such as psychology and cognitive science
play key roles in interaction design” (p. 3A). In fact, human attention, perception, and
decision-making are elements of cognitive psychology that are considered essential
knowledge for interface designers and HCI researchers (Rozanski and Haake, 2003).
Increasing use of IT has forced HCI interface designers to make HCI experiences
easier and more fluid as they come to understand the similarities and differences
associated with human-to-human interactions (Shechtman and Horowitz, 2003). There is
evidence to suggest that interpersonally oriented perceptions such as suspicion and trust
might also be the same kinds of perceptions we hold of IT/computers. Therefore, the
following discussion draws parallels to the elements of interpersonal suspicion and trust
within the context of the HCI literature.
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The Basis of User Suspicion Toward IT
The Human-Computer “Social” Interaction
Bonito, et al. (1999) posited that HCI is perceived by many individuals as having
the same relational implications as interpersonal or human-to-human interactions. For
example, “virtual agents can be designed to appear and act more or less human” (Ibid., p.
229). With so much attention focused on the human aspects of the HCI, there is reason to
suggest that human interaction with computers may be grounded in the same sorts of
interpersonal perceptions and processes that are called into play during human interaction
with other humans—those that are inherently social in nature. In fact, the notion of a
human-computer “social” interaction may form the basis for why computer users become
suspicious of IT.
Nass, Steuer, and Tauber (1994) conducted a study consisting of five experiments
using experienced computer users (i.e., computer-literate college students), hypothesizing
that the interaction of humans toward computers is fundamentally social. The authors
reported that the responses of the participants in their experiments were indeed natural
responses to social situations. For example, some people demonstrated tendencies
towards certain social norms such as politeness toward their computers. In addition, the
authors found that gender stereotypes applied to HCI when participant responses aligned
with established social norms, such as “Males who praise are more likable than females
who praise” (Ibid., p. 76). Participants associated different computer voices (i.e.,
computers synthesizing male and female voices were utilized in the experiments) as
distinct social actors.
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Other studies also lend credence to the socially-oriented HCI argument (Nass,
Moon, Fogg, Reeves, and Dryer, 1995; Neumann, 1989; Lee and Nass, 2003). For
example, Lee and Nass (2003) tested aspects of social interactions such as similarityattraction (e.g., a person is more attracted to another who has a matching personality than
one who does not match), consistency-attraction (e.g., people tend to like others who
show consistent behavior because of their predictability), and social presence (e.g., a
person may perceive an intelligent being or inanimate object is able to interact) in their
HCI experiments (Ibid., p. 290). The authors found significant evidence, via participants’
social responses to the aspects of social interactions, that human-computer social
interactions can be established in a HCI.
Maintaining a socio-personal human-computer relationship is an increasingly
important interest in HCI research. Bickmore and Picard (2005) suggest in order for users
to experience an enjoyable, productive, and trusting interaction with a computer, the
psychological aspects of human-human interactions must be addressed and incorporated
into the design of the HCI and interface. Therefore, one of the goals for HCI researchers
is to design social interfaces that aid the initiation and maintenance of the humancomputer social relationship because it has an impact on perceptions of the computer
(Shechtman & Horowitz, 2003). Due to the preponderance of evidence that suggests we
have socially-oriented perceptions of our computers, the issue of suspicion towards IT
will further be explored using some of the same theoretical lenses and perspectives that
appeared in the interpersonal literature cited in the earlier sections of this review
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Situational and Third-Party Aroused Suspicion
User suspicion toward IT may be aroused by one’s situation or environment, or
via third-party information. Fogg and Tseng (1999) suggest the situation in which one
interacts with IT affects a trust-decision. For example, a majority of users simply use
technology because it makes doing certain tasks easier, faster, and more reliable through
the course of their personal or professional lives; therefore, it is reasonable to conclude
that most users are not as discerning about their technology as IT professionals might be.
Through the nature of an IT specialist’s profession (e.g., military, computer & network
security, law enforcement, management information systems), suspicion is quite often a
necessity (Conti, Ahamad, and Stasko, 2005; Hollebeek & Waltzman, 2004).
Negative information from third-parties also influences suspicion. However, both
the third-party itself and the information provided from the third-party must be perceived
by the user as credible. Credibility, as mentioned in the previous interpersonal literature,
is an evaluation of a person’s trustworthiness. However, Fogg and Tseng (1999) suggest
in evaluating computer credibility “a person makes an assessment of both trustworthiness
and expertise to arrive at an overall credibility assessment” (p. 80). For example, users
often rely on the advice of other users’ inputs (which they themselves are perceived by
the user as credible) regarding new technologies or applications, while the same
companies developing these technologies rely on users’ inputs to make modifications and
improvements to their products (Binstock, 1999). According to Fogg and Tseng (1999),
credibility of these companies in the form of their perceived reputation may impact user
perceptions of such companies IT products and services. As suggested in the
interpersonal literature, suspicion arousal prior to an interaction, whether it is
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situationally-aroused or via a third-party, provides the initial anchoring decision that
influences further cognitive processing involved in the suspicion process that follows.
Therefore, user suspicion towards IT seems to draw upon the same initiating mechanisms
as those found in interpersonal suspicion, as is the need for an initial anchor point from
which further decisions or deliberations are then made.
Suspicious Predisposition
A predisposition of suspicion toward technology is referred to in this discussion
as a generalized technology suspicion or what this author simply refers to as “GTS.” GTS
is similar to the generalized communicative suspicion (GCS) mentioned in the previous
interpersonal literature (Levine & McCornack, 1991) and is a relevant element of IT user
suspicion. However, unlike GCS, which is a belief that all incoming communication
behaviors are deceptive (Ibid.), a GTS is a perception that there is reason to be suspicious
of all technology. Note that the object of suspicion is the technology, not the information
residing on it or information via a technology mediated communication. Discussion on
suspicion caused by information residing on technology or technology mediated
communication is discussed in a later section.
I propose, however, that people differ in GTS – whereas some people are
predisposed to it, others are not. Just as well, Levine and McCornack (1991) did not
imply that everyone had a predisposition for GCS, only that not all people are
predisposed to make this generalization. GTS is a result of general assumptions people
make about others and objects as a result stereotypes and culture (Fogg &Tseng, 1999).
For example, we generally believe that people are truthful (McCornack & Parks, 1986:
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Stiff et al., 1992); however, we do not hold the same regard toward salesmen. Similarly,
people generally presume computers are good and trustworthy tools that provide accurate
and timely information; however, computers that run simulations, instruct users, or
perhaps are complex decision aids such as air traffic control systems are typically held
suspect (Neumann, 1989; Fogg & Tseng, 1999).
Further argument suggests GTS is a result of a lack of faith in technology. “Faith”
is synonymous to trust, confidence, and belief. According to McKnight and Kacmar
(2007), “Faith in technology is different from faith in people because technology has
neither volition nor motives” (p. 425). Faith in technology then implies a predisposed
trust, confidence, or belief in technology, which therefore eliminates or bypasses the
search for underlying motives and behavior (i.e., suspended judgment). However, not all
people trust technology, as suggested in the aforementioned discussion on situational and
third-party aroused suspicion, and even more so if one is “technophobic”(i.e., fear of
technology as manifested by one’s anxiety about the interaction and negative attitude
toward technology or the interaction itself; Korukonda, 2004; Thorpe & Brosnan, 2004).
Hence, GTS is a plausible argument that a predisposition of suspicion toward IT exists,
just as GCS is in the context of interpersonal interactions.
Experience and Expectations
Muir (1987) posited that general expectations resulting from the predictability of
computer behavior, as a result of experience, is directly related to trust. He further noted
observations prior to and during a HCI lead to behavioral evidence that may support or
contradict initial judgments (positive or negative) of a trust-decision. Because predictable
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and reliable behavior of a technology facilitates trust in that technology (Flechais,
Riegelsberger, and Sasse, 2006), we expect our computers to always be available (i.e.,
not break down) and consistently do the jobs they were designed for. Fogg and Tseng
(1999) suggest first-hand experience over a period to time leads to a person’s level of
belief or “experienced credibility” toward a HCI. Therefore, repeated interactions with
technology results in generalized expectations that we use as the basis or anchor for the
subsequent decision of computer trustworthiness. Again, the anchor adjusts between
interactions and during an interaction as a means of constant reevaluation (Muir, 1987).
The previous interpersonal literature suggests deviation from expectations may
lead to suspicion of another person. Likewise, when it comes to technology, deviation of
expectations may lead to suspicion of the technology. Binstock (1999) proposed that both
the interface design and functionality of the technology are necessary to ensure user
expectations are met, and to facilitate the maximum user experience. In other words,
when systems are designed to ensure the HCI flows naturally and with relative simplicity,
only then will the user experience be fully realized.
The “user experience” implies that the HCI is free from negative aspects
associated with an interaction, such as an aesthetically unpleasing interface design, slow
response, and functionally inept computer or application (Binstock, 1999). For example,
errors such as a computer crashing or locking up, especially if these errors are
experienced repeatedly, may lead to questioning a computer’s credibility (Fogg and
Tseng, 1999). Therefore, suspicion of the technology may be initiated due to the lack of a
satisfactory user experience.
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However, HCI designers and technology manufacturers must be careful not to
over compensate their expectations of the user experience. Bonito et al. (1999, p. 236)
found the manipulation of human-like qualities of anthropomorphic interfaces used in
their study did not affect participants’ evaluations of HCIs as anticipated. The authors
predicted the more human-like an interface was, the more a human participant in a HCI
would evaluate the interaction as positive. Instead, the interface did not match user
expectations because they viewed the interface as so unrealistic or unbelievable that it
invoked user suspicion toward the interface (Ibid.). Hence, the study demonstrated that
generalized user expectations can affect the expectations of HCI designers if designer
expectations are impractical or do not match user expectations.
Dispositional Inference Judgment
As suggested in the aforementioned discussion, HCI research extends into the
social, cognitive, and behavioral aspects of the user. One of the elements of suspicion
(and trust) is the notion of dispositional inference, an inference which also applies to the
study and practice of HCI. For example, computer users make inferences toward
computers based on “aesthetics and perceived usability” (Murphy, Stanney, and
Hancock, 2003). Specifically, the authors suggest that there is a correlation between the
way a computer (or interface) looks and its perceived usability. In other words, computer
design may invoke either positive or negative affect toward the functionality of the
computer depending on whether the design is pleasing or not to the user. Murphy et al.
(2003) posits an “explanation for this phenomenon is the halo effect, which proposes that
the most obvious or salient characteristic (such as if a user finds a computer aesthetically
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pleasing) is perceived first and tends to bias perceptions and inferences that come after”
(p. 1). Although this is an initial belief, and possibly contrary to rationale, it may persist
until more information is gathered (Gilbert, Tafordi, and Malone, 1993). Hence, the halo
effect is similar to the anchoring principle of the suspicion process.
According to Rozanski and Haake (2003), usability is a term used to recognize
that “a system not only works, but also does what it is intended to do” (p. 182). For
example, a laptop used by the typical student may be fine for everyday schoolwork, but
may not be appropriate for a soldier on the battlefield that needs a ruggedized,
lightweight version with different applications, interface, and interaction design. Both
laptops may work fine, but each is appropriate to a different user, environment, and
purpose. Thus, a user may make an inference concerning a computer’s ability to perform
a task simply by making an inferred judgment based on what the computer looks like, it’s
applications, interface, or interaction design. Fogg and Tseng (1999) call this “surface
credibility” or in other words, “people do judge a book by its cover” (p.83).
Uncertainty and Self-Efficacy
Thus far, discussions on the elements of user suspicion toward IT were presented
either implicitly or explicitly with the object of suspicion being the technology itself.
However, there is also another object worth mentioning that may influence user suspicion
toward IT – the object of self. Our nature and the nature of our cognitive processes imply
that such suspicion and trust of IT can in fact be tied up in our own feelings about self
and our abilities. Hence, the elements of uncertainty and self-efficacy are brought forth as
relative aspects of our discussion of suspicion toward IT.
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The interpersonal literature suggests suspicion may be generated as a result of
uncertainty (Kee and Knox, 1970). The element of uncertainty applies to HCI as well,
because a person places himself in a position of relative uncertainty – uncertainty about
the technology. To elaborate, a computer (or any other technology) user, by initiating an
interaction with a computer, places him or herself in an environment in which he may
lack complete knowledge and experience of that system or its application (de Vries,
Midden, and Bouwhuis, 2003). De Vries, et al. (2003) suggests that people are uneasy
about using computers and software because of “a lack of knowledge about the
application that causes users to feel uncertain about the outcome of a task” (p. 720).
Gross and Rosson (2007) conducted a study on computer user’s understanding of
computer security. All participants in their study were experienced computer users in
their line of work, but had no special training or job tasks related to computer security.
The authors found that participants had only a general knowledge and limited experience
of hacker (including phishing) attacks, as well as the tools (e.g., virus scanners, spyware,
and firewalls) necessary to prevent attacks. Furthermore, user behavior suggested
inappropriate action a suspected security problem arose. For example, less than half of
the participants in Gross and Rosson’s (2007) study did not report legitimate security
incidents to their IT staff when they suspected a security issue; rather they dismissed it as
a possible functional computer error. Hence, uncertainty and self-efficacy seem to go
hand-in-hand in the context of interaction with technology.
Self-Efficacy is a concept derived from the Social Cognitive Theory (Bandura,
1986) and refers to “people’s judgments of their capabilities to organize and execute
courses of action required to attain designated types of performances” (Ibid., p. 391). A
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person’s belief in his/her abilities affects his/her perception and evaluation of self in
performance of tasks, whether it is mental, physical, social, or psychological. According
to Bandura, “Among the different aspects of self-knowledge, perhaps none is more
influential in people’s daily lives than conceptions of their personal efficacy” (p. 390).
Indeed, Compeau, Higgins, and Huff (1999) found that self-efficacy had a direct effect on
computer use.
But does belief in oneself influence one’s suspicion and trust of a computer
system? Dassonville, Jolly, and Desodt (1996) suggest that “Trust between man and
machine is a particularly imprecise and uncertain variable” (p. 319). The authors propose
that the complexities of trusting a computer system is exacerbated by the fact that a user
is part of the whole “system” and this adds a dynamic element to the HCI process. In
essence, belief in oneself or perceived knowledge of one’s abilities, as a result of being
part of the larger “system,” should have an effect on the interaction between human and
computer and ultimately the perceptions of said computer through the course of those
interactions. Although the research may be unclear at present as to exactly how selfefficacy impacts suspicion and trust, the fact that self-efficacy impacts any perceptions of
technology at all suggest that it may also impact certain specific perceptions of
technology to include those associated with notions of suspicion or trust.
Technologically Mediated Communication
Clearly, the elements of situational and outside influence, predisposition,
expectation, behavioral (dispositional) inference, uncertainty, and self-efficacy are
potential contributors to users’ suspicion toward IT. In addition, the idea of a human-
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computer “social” interaction suggests that the interpersonal notions of suspicion and
trust may also play critical roles in our perceptions of IT. However, this study has, until
now, focused on technological devices, such as the computer, as instruments of task
production, with little mention on use of technology as a channel for information. What
happens when we consider suspicion of technology used as a medium for interaction with
another when the object of that suspicion may be blurred between the medium that
facilitates the interaction (i.e., a technology channel) and the target of the interaction
itself (i.e., another person, organization, etc.)?
According to Baltes, Dickson, Sherman, Bauer, and LaGanke (2002), computers
and other computing technologies, such as the Internet, have transformed the way we
communicate and created new ways in which we work together. Some examples of these
technologies include the telephone, fax, email, document sharing, instant text-messaging,
teleconferencing, and video conferencing (Horn, 2001; Baltes et al., 2002). In addition,
the Internet is filled with websites that contain virtually any subject matter and cater to
virtually anyone. From medical to financial advice, online shopping and banking, to
sports, music, and academics, the list goes on and on. Although the advantages of
technology-mediated communication (TMC) are abundant, many individuals find it very
difficult to establish a trust relationship with another, especially via a technological
medium where face-to-face interaction is not possible (Riegelsberger, Sasse, and
McCarthy, 2005).
In particular, the concerns that are inherent to interpersonal face-to-face
communications are intensified as a result of using TMC. A major concern, perhaps one
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that may even lead to suspicion of technology per se, is the notion that technology may
actually persuade us to do things contrary to what we emotionally, cognitively, and
behaviorally would otherwise do. Berichevsky and Neuenschwander (1999) propose that
people, in attempts to persuade others, use technology as a means to “amplify” their
messages (Ibid., p. 51). In addition, many of the interpersonal or human-to-human
processes such as suspicion and trust also manifest themselves in HCIs (Shechtman and
Horowitz, 2003) as mentioned in the aforementioned human-computer social interaction
section. Fundamentally, a TMC interaction is social in nature, more so than an
exclusively human-to-computer interaction, because another person is involved in the
interaction. Therefore, unlike HCI, suspicion of IT may stem from a user’s perception of
a person on the other end of a TMC interaction, rather than solely the technology itself.
Because HCI designers are becoming increasingly focused on designing more social
systems, it follows that the interpersonal mechanisms associated with suspicion may also
be used and intensified in a HCI.
TMC facilitates suspicion as a factor on both ends of the interaction because
whether a person is a sender or receiver, there is a constant cognitive effort to discern
deception from truthful messages—effort that is complicated by TMC due to the lack of
feedback from verbal and nonverbal cues that are inherent in face-to-face interactions
(Giordano, Stoner, Brouer, George, 2007). Due to the nature of certain types of media,
cues used for deceptive communication detection may even become distorted or lost
entirely (Horn, 2001). For example, text messaging does not provide visual and audio
cues, therefore a lack of verbal and nonverbal information may arouse suspicion and
perhaps prolong a suspended judgment due to the lack of information needed to
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disambiguate a trust decision (Riegelsberger et al., 2005). Even video media, which do
provide visual cues, often do not provide the quality of nonverbal deception cues intrinsic
to face-to-face interactions in order to discern truth from deception (Ibid.). Hence, use of
TMC, as opposed to traditional face-to-face communications, provides users better
capabilities to circumvent or at least diminish our suspicion and trust process, or in other
words…deceive us. Certainly, the large volumes of deception literature related to the use
of TMC to deceive others is evidence of the nefarious use of technology (Horn, 2001;
Biros, George, & Zmud, 2002; Carlson, George, Burgoon, Adkins, & White, 2004;
George, Marett, Tilley, 2004; Qin, Burgoon, & Nunamaker, Jr, 2004).
In summary, the reason for which it might be difficult for some to disambiguate
their feelings about suspicion towards IT with suspicion towards others using that IT to
communicate with them is primarily due to the social interaction that takes place within a
TMC. As mentioned, TMC is essentially a human-to-human interaction that uses
technology as a medium to communicate; hence, there is a social aspect to TMC.
However, the issues surrounding the “human-computer social interaction” discussed in
the aforementioned sections also bring social factors into play for HCIs of the
technologies themselves (Shechtman and Horowitz, 2003). It is logical to conclude that
that many of the interpersonal elements of suspicion emerge in the context of an HCI, but
may also contribute to user confusion as to who or what they are actually suspicious
of…the technology, or the person they are interacting with via the technology.
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Conclusion
The intersection of the concepts of suspicion, trust, and deception suggests a
significant overlap between them. Much exists in the way of suspicion-, trust-, and
deception-based literature that has an “IT flavor”; however, to date there have been few,
if any, very pointed investigations that deal explicitly with the notion of what makes
people suspicious of technology itself – not the information on that technology, nor the
messages from others, or people with whom that technology interconnects us. What does
this type of suspicion entail? Are the elements and mechanisms of suspicion of IT the
same as those for interpersonal suspicion? What concepts from the interpersonal and HCI
literature’s treatment of suspicion, trust, and deception survive into the notion of
suspicion towards IT? Are any of the elements of TMC-related suspicion and trust
informative in such contexts? The following chapter will outline the specific
methodology used to answer such questions before the results of the current study will be
discussed, as well as the conclusions drawn from those results.
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CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY
Overview
Because of the complexity surrounding the perceptions and processes associated
with user suspicion towards IT, an exploratory and primarily qualitative approach was
used to gather and analyze data relevant to the phenomenon of interest. In particular, a
modified version of Northcutt and McCoy’s (2004) Interactive Qualitative Analysis
(IQA) was employed throughout this study. Significant portions of this chapter were
based on the work of Turner (2006) and are used with the permission of the author. IQA
is a qualitative systems-centric approach to data-collection and analysis that involves
participant’s perceptions, based on their experiences, of what they consider reality of the
explored phenomenon. Hence, the outcome of the IQA method is to establish meaning of
a phenomenon by using the “eyes” of participants who are closely related to the
phenomenon, allowing those participants to identify the constituent elements of that
phenomenon and propose and describe relationships between said elements. The
following sections will outline the specific aspects of the IQA methodology used in this
study, which include a focus group and report.
Focus Group
The purpose of an IQA focus group is to develop a sense of the various perceptual
elements that are part of the problem/phenomenon under consideration. The focus group
is a means of data collection that reduces researcher bias because the researcher simply
acts as a facilitator for the IQA process while minimizing external influence toward the
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participants and on the content of the data collected. Participants, known as constituents
in an IQA focus group (Northcutt & McCoy, 2004), are free to identify and analyze their
own elements that contribute to a problem/phenomenon. Through group discussion,
constituents organize their own data into meaningful categories called affinities. Further
analysis involves constituents “articulating their own perceived relationships of influence
among the affinities” (Turner, 2006, p. 47). IQA is a system-centric approach and was an
appropriate methodological approach for this research because the system in question is
the social system existing between human and technology. According to Turner (2006)
IQA “…seeks to capture the lived reality of individuals and their experiences, actively
involving study participants in the mapping and depiction of their stories to fully explore
a given phenomenon” (p. 47).
Focus Group Participants and Recruitment
The discussion up to this point has implied a generalized population of interest
(e.g., IT/computer users). However, for the purpose of this study, a constituency of ITprofessionals, who also happen to be Air Force graduate level students from the Air
Force Institute of Technology (AFIT), was solicited to serve as study participants. The
primary reason for the choice of IT professionals to serve as constituents was based on
the assumption that people who have experienced, or are at least closest to the
phenomenon being investigated, are best able to provide the details necessary to generate
a robust understanding of the complex problem/phenomenon (Northcutt & McCoy,
2004). An IT professional as defined in this study is a U.S. Air Force communications
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officer or civilian professional with at least 4 years of service and experience in their
career field.
It was determined that 4 years in an IT-related field should provide for adequate
knowledge and experience working with diverse technologies. This assumption was
grounded in the fact that, in general, Air Force communications officers are placed in
diverse technical type positions such as monitoring and maintaining base or Air Force
wide network traffic, providing phones (analog or IP), radios, cell phones, computer
hardware/software, in addition to security, policy development and management
associated with these functions, to include project or program management. Furthermore,
the constituents were all graduate students attending an Information Resources
Management (IRM) degree program.
The AFIT IRM program prepares graduates for leadership roles encompassing the
operational, strategic, and tactical use of IT by exploiting the latest technologies, creating
successful policies and processes, and applying sound management techniques to gain
superior military advantage over adversaries. Discussion and research of the latest issues
surrounding IT in general, such as the use and adaptation of technology, as well as
security and management of technology from personal and organizational contexts, is a
relevant part of the IRM program. Hence, the focus group constituency of Air Force
communications officers and civilian professionals reflected the sort of diversity in work
and educational experience and perspectives on IT appropriate to explore suspicion of IT
in its many possible forms and incarnations from a very theoretically compelling
perspective.
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Recruitment was conducted through email announcement and word of mouth by
the principle researcher to all 31 AFIT IRM graduate students in the 2008 graduating
class. A total of 15 male participants agreed to join the focus group for a response rate of
47%. As an incentive, participants were given the opportunity to place their name in a
drawing to win monetary prizes that included a first-, second- and third-place winner,
with first-place having a significantly larger amount. The drawing was held immediately
after the focus group meeting.
Focus Group Preparation
The focus group session was conducted in a closed conference room in order to
avoid distractions. All constituents were briefed on ethical issues regarding research
participation and the importance of the study. Constituents were also set at ease to foster
a relaxed atmosphere in order to facilitate the free flow of ideas needed for the
subsequent step of brainstorming. Because all constituents knew each other and many of
them had already worked together in groups as a result of attending the same graduate
program, all were already comfortable working with each other. In addition, all were
reminded by the principle researcher that nobody was evaluated on their inputs; rather,
they were simply encouraged to take an active part in group discussion and that each of
their inputs were important and relevant to the study. Each constituent was provided
markers and note cards. The constituency was given a brief overview of the focus group
process (i.e., brainstorming, grouping of ideas, and establishing influence relationships
between the ideas). A brief question and answer session was conducted to ensure the
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constituency understood the process. Once the principle researcher felt each member had
a good idea of the focus group process, the exercise began.
Identifying Factors/Affinities
A mental exercise was first conducted in which the constituency was asked
questions designed to invoke experiences, perceptions, impressions, emotions, and
anything else that came to mind as it pertained to suspicion of technology. The group was
told to visualize internally any and all of their thoughts and experiences relating to
suspicion of IT, and then instructed to silently and individually brainstorm ideas,
perceptions, emotions, and anything else of relevance and write those thoughts down –
one thought per card.
After about 20-minutes, writing had come to a noticeable stop; each member was then
asked to tape their cards to a wall in the conference room. The group was then asked to
clarify the meaning of each card, including ambiguous cards, to ensure all members of
the group understood the meaning of each card without any direct intervention on the part
of the principle researcher. This was a self-guided exercise in which the cards’ meanings
were clarified and then grouped together to create meaning. All cards were addressed, at
times with adamantly diverse opinions; however, group consensus of each card’s
meaning was eventually achieved after approximately 20-minutes.
After a 10-minute break, the constituency then worked together to categorize (i.e.,
made connections to) their individual experiences or components from the note cards into
logical and meaningful groupings, sorting the cards into clusters which they perceived
had similar meaning, a process referred to as inductive coding (Northcutt & McCoy,
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2004). After constituents sorted the cards into their collective categories, a brief
description of each category was provided via self-directed group consensus to ensure
shared understanding and meaning of each “category” – similar to the preceding process
used for individual cards. The categories were then identified, described, and given a
distinct and relevant name by the constituency itself. At this point, the named category
was referred to as an affinity (Ibid., 2004). An example of the aforementioned process of
categorizing and affinities is illustrated in Figure 1.
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Sub-affinity
Name
Name

Affinity 2
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Card
Card

Card
Card
Card
Card

Figure 1. Focus Group Card Sorting and Affinities (Source: Turner, 2006)

Identifying Relationships Among Factors/Affinities
After affinity names were given and the constituency was content with their
results, the constituents were given a 15-minute recess to allow time for the collection
and printing of the voting sheets, also known as an Affinity Relationship Table (ART).
Table 1 is an example of an ART with six affinities. The ART gave constituents the
opportunity to reflect on the nature of every possible relationship between every possible
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pairing of affinities. Once the group reconvened, individuals were asked to use the ART
to identify the nature of the influence relationships between all possible combinations of
the affinity pairs (i.e., based on their individual perceptions), followed by a description of
each relationship.
Table 1. Sample Affinity Relationship Table (Source: Turner, 2006)
Focus Group
Affinity Relationship Table
Affinity Name
1. Affinity 1
2. Affinity 2
3. Affinity 3
4. Affinity 4
5. Affinity 5
6. Affinity 6
Affinity Pair
Relationship
1

→ 2

1
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
3
3
3
4
4
5

3
4
5
6
3
4
5
6
4
5
6
5
6
6

Possible Relationships
A→B
A←B
A <> B (No Relationship)
Example of the relationship either in natural language or
in the form of an IF/THEN statement of relationship

The ART included a space for the participants to indicate the direction of
influence between affinities such as: A influences B, B influences A, or no perceived
relationship between affinities. If an individual thought two affinities influenced each
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other equally, they were told to pick only one (e.g., the stronger) influence relationship.
For example, a constituent who felt strongly that affinity 1 influenced affinity 2 would
place a right arrow between the pair in the ART as illustrated in Table 1. The constituents
continued this process until their ART form was completed.
The constituency was also asked to provide a brief description of each influence
relationship in the form of cause and effect or if/then, an activity referred to as theoretical
coding (Northcutt & McCoy, 2004). Constituents wrote descriptions on their ARTs in the
space provided next to each affinity pair relationship. The principle researcher
encouraged constituents to provide concrete examples relating to each constituent’s
perceptions or experiences because examples were considered ideal for describing their
individual propositions of relational and directional influence of one affinity toward
another. Although each individual was asked to do this, some chose not to provide a
specific example; however, each constituent at least provided a completed ART with a
full articulation of the affinity pair influence relationships for a total of fifteen ARTs.
After the principle researcher collected each completed ART and the incentive drawings
were conducted, all constituents were dismissed and the principle researcher collected all
note cards while keeping them in their respective categories/affinities.
Report
The last phase of the IQA process was to generate a visual representation of the
problem/phenomenon investigated. An illustration of the problem/phenomenon is
provided via a systems influence diagram (SID) as depicted in Figure 2. The SID
represents the common lived experiences and thought processes (or mindmap) of the
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constituency as they pertain to the phenomenon under investigation. The diagram was
drawn from the theoretical coding generated by the focus group constituents as recorded
on the ARTs.

66

33

55

22

44

11

Figure 2. Sample SID (Source: Turner, 2006)

Hence, the problem/phenomenon was represented as a system of interconnected affinities
showing cause and effect relationships as envisioned by the overall consensus of the
focus group constituency. According to Turner (2006) “once a system of affinities and
relationships is formulated and described, it essentially becomes a ‘theory of lived
experience’ and can be ‘exercised’ and tested much as any other theory might be” (p.
247). Indeed, the process used to create a final SID required an extensive analysis of the
data collected, including the perceived relationships of the individual constituents. In this
instance, data collected from the focus group was compiled and analyzed to form the
final SID and report. The following chapters will present a comprehensive summary and
interpretation of these data and the detailed steps used to generate the SID and final
report.
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CHAPTER 4: RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
Focus Group Results and Analysis
The self-guided focus group approach provided a method to collect data with
minimal researcher influence except as raconteur to facilitate constituent discussion and
participation toward the problem/phenomenon as it relates to individual experiences or
perceptions. Focus group constituents produced 85 cards and 8 affinities for analysis and
interpretation.
Table 2. Focus Group Results
Affinities (elements)
Relevant to User
Suspicion Toward IT

1

Corporate Trust

2

Data Loss

3

Ease of Use

4

Policy

5

Privacy

6

Reliability

7

Safety

8

Security

General Meaning and Theme
Business needs conflict with consumer interests: IT companies,
including manufacturers may restrict/delay the disclosure and
distribution of the latest technologies, or prematurely distribute
insufficiently tested products, both of which may lead one to distrust IT
companies/manufacturers and their products.
Loss of data invokes suspicion: Data loss is attributed to obsolete IT
products (e.g., hardware/software), or new systems (e.g., database or
network).
IT may be too complex: Users reluctant to use IT that is too difficult to
use, or have too many functions.
User needs conflict with organizational policies: Management decisions
to implement certain policies may lead to extreme constraint or
overreaction to adapt or use IT.
Information is susceptible to unauthorized disclosure: Users suspicious
of IT as a media for social and professional interaction, because of
nefarious entities monitoring or stealing information via an IT medium.
User expectations of IT: Users expect IT to be predictable, or in other
words do what it was intended to do without failure.
Fear of physical harm: Users expect IT to be safe, but are uncertain that
companies are necessarily taking every precaution to ensure user’s
safety, as evidenced what is reported by news media or other sources.
Security of the technology or system: Security means systems are
patched, including necessary spyware and antivirus software, and
physical security is in place as needed.
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An overview of the results from the focus group’s axial coding and affinity-naming
activities are depicted in the Focus Group Results (Table 2), to include the group’s
general meaning and themes embodied by the contents of each note card under each of
the eight affinities. A comprehensive explanation of the affinities will follow.
Affinity Reconciliation
Perhaps due to imposed time constraints, the focus group constituents seemed to
express the need to make quick decisions in their axial coding activities. Furthermore,
observations of the focus group’s dynamics suggested several constituents’ sense of
urgency may have precipitated consensus of affinity names prematurely. A post-hoc
analysis of each note card within each affinity was therefore accomplished unencumbered
by the time constraints of the focus group meeting itself. Hence, the naming of the
obtained affinities was re-examined and reconciled via triangulation process based on
careful scrutiny of the contents of each note card, the affinity/category names provided by
the focus group, reflections on the nature of focus group discussions, and the researcher’s
own knowledge of the relevant literature. Results of the affinity reconciliation process are
presented in the following sequence of tables.
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Credibility
The constituency felt IT companies and manufacturers are motivated to increase
profits; however, they believe these companies do so at the expense of the consumer/user.
In addition, some software includes backdoors as a means of tracking usage of such
applications. When it comes to the latest technology, the high initial costs and misleading
information lead to suspicion or distrust toward such companies, their products, and
services. These credibility judgments regarding the motives of the companies behind
various forms of IT (as well as the IT itself) may have been developed through personal
experiences, but were often derived from external sources such as other users or from
information provided by news sources (i.e., TV, radio, websites, blogs, etc.).
Table 3. Credibility Affinity
Focus Group Affinity:
Corporate Trust
Business needs conflict with consumer
interests: IT companies, including
manufacturers may restrict/delay the
disclosure and distribution of the latest
technologies, or prematurely distribute
insufficiently tested products, both of
which may lead one to distrust IT
companies/manufacturers and their
products.

Renamed Affinity: Credibility
Although the group decided on naming this affinity
“corporate trust”, the general premise of inputs
indicated questioning a company’s trustworthiness
(i.e., credibility), to include its products/services. The
credibility of IT companies and manufacturers is an
important and essential aspect of whether a user
trusted a company, its products and services.

Personal Impact/Outcome
Based on personal experiences, several constituents admitted the loss of data had
a detrimental affect on their perceptions of the technology – one that lead to user
suspicion. Users blame obsolete technology, such as floppy disks, for losing data. They
also blame new technology or systems that may not be implemented properly due to the
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fact that they are so new that unforeseen negative events may happen; hence, leading one
to suspect the technology to the extent of avoiding its use. Although the focus group titled
this affinity “data loss,” it was only when a user experienced the lost of his data that any
impact was truly felt. Therefore, a decision was made to forego the specific term ‘data
loss’ for the more general notion of ‘personal impact/outcome.’
Table 4. Personal Impact/Outcome Affinity
Focus Group Affinity: Data Loss
Loss of data invokes suspicion: Data
loss is attributed to obsolete IT products
(e.g., hardware/software), or new
systems (e.g., database or network).

Renamed Affinity: Personal Impact/Outcome
Several constituents had experienced loss of data
either at work or at home. These negative experiences
had an impact on their own perceptions of the
technology, whereby they blamed the technology for
the data loss.

Complexity
IT users seem to have a general expectation that IT products are complex. Users
noted a general trend that technology is becoming increasingly more difficult to use and
understand. Interestingly, group discussion made reference to the excessively ‘thick’ user
manuals that accompany new products as an indication of the complexity of current IT
products. Several constituents identified IT capabilities as more complicated with more
functions than needed or used. One individual noted, “A new computer program is
‘better’ but the learning curve is too steep to successfully implement it.” Constituents felt
the relative uncertainty of such IT products invokes user suspicion due to the lack of a
user’s in-depth comprehension of the technology. Finally, technological complexity not
only affects whether or not a person will use a particular technology, but may also
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attribute to the difficulty of convincing others to use it, such as if one was a manager
expecting his/her coworkers to use a new database application.
Table 5. Complexity Affinity
Focus Group Affinity: Ease of Use
The ‘lack of’ simplicity in a
technological product may contribute to
a user’s reluctance to use it and negative
perception of such technology.

Renamed Affinity: Complexity
The content of the cards and nature of the
conversations seemed to center on larger issues of IT
complexity rather than just the ease of use of the
interface for that IT.

Organizational Context
The context of an organization is simply the situation or environment within
which organizational members function. Inherent to any organization are the policies
from which members must interpret and abide. However, interpretation and actual use of
such policies may not always reflect the true nature of those policies as indicated by
constituents who said that “policy does not always reflect user needs.” The focus group
constituents were all IT professionals in the Air Force; hence, the environment in which
they use IT is bound and constrained by rather stringent IT policies which are indicative
of the nature in which all directive policies tend to be developed and enforced.
Constituents suggested that sometimes policies imposed by an organization, in this case
the Air Force; generate negative user attitudes such as those that address the
implementation or use of IT. An example given was the implementation of a new system
a constituent felt was redundant of an existing system, yet the system was to be used as
required by policy. Hence, IT policy, as part of the context of the constituent’s
organization, was an important issue that influenced user suspicions of that IT.
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Table 6. Organizational Context Affinity
Focus Group Affinity: Policy

Renamed Affinity: Organizational Context

User needs conflict with organizational
policies: Management decisions to
implement certain policies may lead to
extreme constraint or overreaction to
adapt or use IT.

The group seemed to be focused on the term “Policy”
as an appropriate name for this affinity; however,
individual inputs suggest more than just policy –
instead, it is the much larger “Organizational Context”
in which they use IT.

Security of the Channel
Constituents felt that personal privacy was an important issue that made them
suspicious of IT in general. The group suggested protection of privacy was a critical
element needed in all technology products and services. Constituent inputs suggested a
general distrust of IT communication media. For example, interactive voice, video and
text communications in the form of cell phones, web cams, and email, respectively, were
listed as IT communication channels a user suspected as having the potential to
jeopardize one’s privacy. Group consensus noted the lack of security in IT
communications “leads to fear of using email, chat, and even online forums or blogs.”
The constituency’s knowledge of security vulnerabilities that exist in various
communication media suggested a general suspicion of IT-based communication
channels.
Table 7. Security of the Channel Affinity
Focus Group Affinity: Privacy
Information is susceptible to
unauthorized disclosure: Users
suspicious of IT as a media for social
and professional interaction, because of
nefarious entities monitoring or stealing
information via an IT medium.

Renamed Affinity: Security of the Channel
Most of the individual inputs suggested that the
technological medium used or the “channel” was a
security vulnerability that could put one’s privacy at
risk.
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Expectations
The general theme expressed by the constituency was the notion that IT should
have a degree of reliability and predictability. However, comprehensive interpretation of
the individual inputs on the note cards implied that reliability and predictability were
based on individual expectations of the technology. In addition, constituents noted their
knowledge and experiences contributed to their expectations. For example, constituent
inputs such as “bad experience with bugs in the operating system,” and “excessive
downtime created more stress” indicated a negative valence toward unmet expectations
of the technology and not simply concerns about reliability per se. Hence, the majority of
inputs suggested an emotional connotation toward unmet expectations resulting in
negative experiences and contributing to a user’s suspicion of the technology.
Table 8. Expectations Affinity
Focus Group Affinity: Reliability
User expectations of IT: Users expect
IT to be predictable, to do what it was
intended to do without failure.

Renamed Affinity: Expectations
Although the group decided to name this affinity
“Reliability” the crux of the inputs suggested user
“Expectations” of IT.

Vicarious Experience/3rd-Party Influence
Because no constituent admitted to experiencing an unsafe event regarding the
use of a technology, the notion of “physical harm” that was originally expressed during
the focus group as “safety” seemed suspect in its own right. However, the principle
researcher’s notes regarding focus group discussions indicated this idea of safety was not
unsubstantiated; rather the constituents were basing their perceptions about IT safety on
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what they had heard from others. Essentially, constituents were basing their ideas and
perceptions on vicarious experiences instead of their own lived experiences.
Table 9. Vicarious Experience/3rd-Party Impact Affinity
Focus Group Affinity: Safety
Fear of physical harm: Users expect IT
to be safe, but are uncertain that
companies are necessarily taking every
precaution to ensure user’s safety as
evidenced by what is reported by news
media or other sources.

Renamed Affinity: Vicarious Experience/
3rd- Party Impact
None of the constituents actually experienced an
unsafe event (at least one that led to physical harm).
Instead, individuals have a general suspicion of the
technology based on vicarious experiences of others
they read/heard about. The impact of third-party
information was enough that constituents decided to
include it as an element of suspicion.

Security of the Technology
The individual inputs indicated a general concern regarding the security issues
that exist within technological hardware and systems. Inputs such as “portable hardware
ignores security” and “unpatched or hacked systems” indicated a level of IT security
consciousness from the constituents. It was not surprising that IT professionals in a
security conscious context (such as the Air Force) would focus in on security.
Table 10. Security of the Technology Affinity
Focus Group Affinity: Security
Security of the technology or system:
Security means systems are patched,
including necessary spyware and
antivirus software, and physical security
is in place as needed.

Renamed Affinity: Security of the Technology

Most of the individual inputs suggested a general
concern of the technological hardware and system.
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Pareto Protocol and the Systems Influence Diagram
The IQA Pareto Protocol with Min/Max criterion was used to quantify the
theoretical coded data as a means to create a visual representation of the system of
perception and experience surrounding the affinities associated with IT user suspicion.
The first step in applying the Pareto Protocol was to record the total number of votes for
each affinity-pair relationship. Votes were counted from the individual ARTs and
recorded on the Theoretical Code Frequency Table (Table 11). When a constituent
provided a word-based example, the direction of influence indicated by the example was
used; otherwise, the vote was tallied based on the direction of the arrow alone. As
illustrated in Table 11, the 8-affinity system generated a total of 275 votes (not all
affinity-pairs received a vote) with a total of 56 possible pair wise relationships.

Table 11. Theoretical Code Frequency Table
Theoretical Code Frequency Table
Affinity Name
1. Credibility
2. Personal Impact/Outcome
3. Complexity
4. Organizational Context
5. Security of the Channel
6. Expectations
7. Vicarious Experience/3rd-Party Impact
8. Security of the Technology
Affinity Pair
Relationship
1
1
1
1
1
1

→
←
→
←
→
←

2
2
3
3
4
4

Affinity Pair
Relationship

Frequency
2
9
2
9
5
5

3
3
3
3
3
3
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→
←
→
←
→
←

5
5
6
6
7
7

Frequency
1
6
7
5
5
2

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
3
3

→
←
→
←
→
←
→
←
→
←
→
←
→
←
→
←
→
←
→
←
→
←

5
5
6
6
7
7
8
8
3
3
4
4
5
5
6
6
7
7
8
8
4
4

8
6
3
10
3
5
4
10
3
4
5
7
10
2
11
3
5
0
8
5
1
12

3
3
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
5
5
5
5
5
5
6
6
6
6
7
7

→
←
→
←
→
←
→
←
→
←
→
←
→
←
→
←
→
←
→
←
→
←

8
8
5
5
6
6
7
7
8
8
6
6
7
7
8
8
7
7
8
8
8
8

Total

4
6
9
2
7
1
9
2
9
3
0
3
2
0
7
8
8
0
5
4
1
2
275

Pareto Principle
The total votes cast by the focus group participants were then sorted as illustrated
in Table 12, the Pareto Cumulative Frequency and Power Analysis Table. The IQA
method uses the Pareto principle to take into consideration the nature of people’s
individual and perceptual differences regarding the relationships between individual
affinities by providing an unbiased protocol to calculate and represent a constituency’s
consensus of the overall hypothesized relationships between all affinities. As Turner
(2006) explained:
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Put in systems terms, the Pareto Principle states that in general, 20% of the
variables in a system will account for 80% of the total variation in
outcomes (such as productivity or profit). The essential utility of the
Pareto Principle is this: a minority of the relationships in any system will
account for a majority of the variation within the system. Depending upon
the variation of theoretical coding used, it is quite likely that there will be
some disagreement among either individuals or subgroups about the
nature of a given relationship. IQA uses the Pareto rule of thumb
operationally to achieve consensus and analytically to create a statistical
group composite. The Pareto Cumulative Frequency Chart provides an
efficient method for achieving consensus. (p. 241)
Table 12. Pareto Cumulative Frequency and Power Analysis Table
Affinity Pair
Relationship
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

3
2
1
1
2
4
4
4
1
1
1
5
6
2
2
3
4
5
3
3
1
2
1
1
1
2

←
→
←
←
→
→
→
→
←
←
→
←
→
→
←
→
→
→
←
←
←
←
→
←
←
→

4
6
6
8
5
5
7
8
3
2
5
8
7
8
4
6
6
8
5
8
5
8
4
4
7
4

Frequency
Sorted
(Descending)

Cumulative
Frequency

Cumulative
Percent
(Relation)

Cumulative
Percent
(Frequency)

Power

12
11
10
10
10
9
9
9
9
9
8
8
8
8
7
7
7
7
6
6
6
5
5
5
5
5

12
23
33
43
53
62
71
80
89
98
106
114
122
130
137
144
151
158
164
170
176
181
186
191
196
201

1.8
3.6
5.4
7.1
8.9
10.7
12.5
14.3
16.1
17.9
19.6
21.4
23.2
25.0
26.8
28.6
30.4
32.1
33.9
35.7
37.5
39.3
41.1
42.9
44.6
46.4

4.4
8.4
12.0
15.6
19.3
22.5
25.8
29.1
32.4
35.6
38.5
41.5
44.4
47.3
49.8
52.4
54.9
57.5
59.6
61.8
64.0
65.8
67.6
69.5
71.3
73.1

2.6
4.8
6.6
8.5
10.3
11.8
13.3
14.8
16.3
17.8
18.9
20.0
21.1
22.3
23.0
23.8
24.6
25.3
25.7
26.1
26.5
26.5
26.6
26.6
26.6
26.7
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27.
28.
29.

2 → 7
3 ← 6
3 → 7

5
5
5

206
211
216

48.2
50.0
51.8

74.9
76.7
78.5

26.7
26.7
26.8

30.

6 → 8

5

221

53.6

80.4

26.8

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

1
2
3
6
2
1
1
2
4
5
1
1
2
3
4
4
5
7
3
3
4
7
2
5
5
6

4
4
4
4
3
3
3
3
3
3
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
0

225
229
233
237
240
243
246
249
252
255
257
259
261
263
265
267
269
271
272
273
274
275
275
275
275
275

55.4
57.1
58.9
60.7
62.5
64.3
66.1
67.9
69.6
71.4
73.2
75.0
76.8
78.6
80.4
82.1
83.9
85.7
87.5
89.3
91.1
92.9
94.6
96.4
98.2
100.0

81.8
83.3
84.7
86.2
87.3
88.4
89.5
90.5
91.6
92.7
93.5
94.2
94.9
95.6
96.4
97.1
97.8
98.5
98.9
99.3
99.6
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0

26.5
26.1
25.8
25.5
24.8
24.1
23.4
22.7
22.0
21.3
20.2
19.2
18.1
17.1
16.0
14.9
13.9
12.8
11.4
10.0
8.6
7.1
5.4
3.6
1.8
0.0

275

Equal Total
Frequency

Equals 100%

Equals 100%

Power =
CPF - CPR

→
←
→
←
←
→
→
→
←
←
→
→
←
←
←
←
→
←
→
→
←
→
←
→
←
←

8
3
8
8
6
6
7
3
8
6
2
3
5
7
5
7
7
8
4
5
6
8
7
6
7
7

Total
Frequency

Table 12 shows the same frequencies of theoretical coding as the previous
theoretical code frequency table, except that they appear now in descending order of
frequency. The four additional columns are:
1) Cumulative Frequency – Each successive entry provides the cumulative
frequency of the number of votes cast for an affinity pair added to the
previous total for a total number of 275 votes.

69

2) Cumulative Percent (Relation) – A cumulative percent calculated from the
total number of 56 possible affinity pair relationships; hence, each relationship
represents 1/56 or approximately 1.8% of the total possible number of
relationships.
3) Cumulative Percent (Frequency) – A cumulative percent calculated from the
total number of votes cast for each affinity pair relationship (275). Each
successive entry provides the percent of votes cast for an affinity pair added to
the previous total for a total of 100% affinity pair relationships.
4) Power – A factor used to identify and evaluate the optimal number of
relationships to be retained in the representation of a perceptual system. Power
is calculated as the difference between Cumulative Percent (Frequency) and
Cumulative Percent (Relation).

Establishing a Cutoff
Essentially, the Pareto Principle is a statistical protocol used to provide
quantitative decision-making criteria indicating relative weights or importance (i.e.,
power) of the qualitative data provided by the focus group. Hence, researcher bias was
minimized as a result of using this protocol to establish the necessary statistical cutoff
(based on the results of the Min/Max criterion of the Pareto Protocol). As illustrated in
Table 12, row 30 is highlighted to indicate the cutoff from which all affinity-pair
relationships located above and including the cutoff point was utilized to create the
resultant System Influence Diagram, or SID.
The IQA method uses the Min/Max criterion of the Pareto Protocol, essentially
the aforementioned 80/20 rule of the Pareto Principle, in order to establish a cutoff.
According to Turner (2006), “In general, IQA systems modeling requires that the selected
affinity-pair relationships account for at least 80 percent of the total variance, often at or
slightly after the point where marginal gains in power begin to decline” (p. 68).
Therefore, when the maximum variance (cumulative percent by frequency) reached 80
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percent and no more marginal gains in power were realized by adding another affinitypair relationship into the set of relationships that would be modeled in the final SID, that
relationship marked the cutoff.
As indicated in Table 12, row 30, the maximum variance obtained at the cutoff
was 80.4 percent and power was 26.8. If the frequency number (frequency sorted
descending) of the affinity pairs repeats into rows beyond 80 cumulative percent of the
ART votes, the cutoff is adjusted to reflect all occurrences of that frequency number prior
to the change of next lower frequency (i.e. all affinity-pairings with a frequency of ‘5’ are
included even if some of the pairing appear at a point beyond which gains in marginal
power no longer increase). In this case, the selected relationships with a frequency of ‘5’
and higher accounted for 53.6 percent of the total relationships appearing in the ART
voting forms, and 80.4 percent of the total votes recorded.
Conflicts
Conflicts occur as a result of the individual differences between the theoretical
coding of affinity-pair relationships and occur when both A → B and A ← B
relationships survive the Min/Max criterion of the Pareto Protocol. Because these types
of relationships were above the established cutoff, either conflicting affinity-pair
relationship was conceivably a “valid” explanation for indicating or explaining the
direction of influence between two affinities. For the initial creation of a system influence
diagram, only one of the two conflicting relationships is used as indicated in the Conflict
Relationship Table (Table 13). The process to resolve conflicts is discussed in the next
section.
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Table 13. Conflict Resolution Table
Conflict Resolution Table
Affinity Pair
Relationship
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
2
2

← 2
← 3
← 4
← 5
←6
← 7
← 8
→ 4
→ 5
← 4
← 8
→ 4
→ 5
→ 6
→ 7

Frequency
9
9
5
6
10
5
10
5
8
7
5
5
10
11
5

Affinity Pair
Relationship

Conflict?

2
3
3
3
3
3
3
4
4
4
4
5
5
6
6

Use*
?

?*
Use
Use
?
?

→
←
←
←
←
→
→
→
→
→
→
←
→
→
→

8
4
5
6
8
6
7
5
6
7
8
8
8
7
8

Frequency

Conflict?

8
12
6
5
6
7
5
9
7
9
9
8
7
8
5

Use

?
Use

Use
?

Constructing the Interrelationship Diagram
Conflicting relationships used in the generation of a System Influence Diagram
were resolved by initially choosing the relationship with the highest frequency while the
relationship with the smaller frequency was placed on “hold” until it could be reconciled
later. As illustrated in Table 13, the word “Use” indicates the conflicting relationship pair
chosen as part of the initial SID; a “?” was used as a placeholder until after the initial SID
was created. Note that the 1 ← 4 and 1 → 4 relationships had equal frequencies as
indicated by the asterisks. The affinity-pair relationship 1← 4 was selected for inclusion
in the initial SID because the frequency of influence from affinity #4 toward the other
affinities was much greater than the frequency of influence towards affinity #4 from the
other affinities. Furthermore, the majority of affinity-pair relationship frequencies
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indicated common influence toward affinity #1. Hence, the 1← 4 relationship was the
more “popularly perceived” of the two relationships in terms of the “flow and direction of
influence” and was therefore used until the conflict was resolved.
The Interrelationship Diagram (IRD) was then used to provide a tabular summary
of the obtained affinity-pair relationships from the previous Pareto Protocol and
determine the relative position of each affinity within the system. By utilizing the
information provided by the Conflict Resolution Table, a full tabular IRD was
constructed. Direction of influence for each of the affinity-pair relationships contained in
the Conflict Resolution Table was transcribed in the Tabular IRD of Affinity
Relationships Table (Table 14).
Table 14. Tabular IRD of Affinity Relationships Table
Tabular IRD
1
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

↑
↑
↑
←
↑
↑
↑

2
←

3
←

↑
←
←
←
←

↑
↑
←
←
↑

4
←
←
←
←
←
←
←

5
↑
↑
←
↑

6
←
↑
↑
↑

7
←
↑
↑
↑
↑

↑

←
←

8
←
↑
←
↑
←
↑

OUT
1
5
3
7
1
3
1
3

IN
6
1
3
0
4
3
4
3

Δ
-5
4
0
7
-3
0
-3
0

Unresolved conflicts are highlighted within the table and are important to note
because these conflicts were placed on “hold” to be used after the initial SID was created.
In tabular form, the IRD depicted relationships that influenced each affinity (In: B → A
and A ← B), and relationships influenced by each affinity (Out: A → B and B ← A)
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(Turner, 2006). A numeric value resulting from subtracting the number of Ins from the
number Outs was used as a numerical indicator of the relative position of each affinity
within the resultant SID as illustrated in the Tabular IRD – Sorted in Descending Order
Table (Table 15).
Table 15. Tabular IRD in Descending Order
Tabular IRD – Sorted in Descending Order of ∆
1

2

3

4
2

↑
↑

↑

↑

3

↑

6

↑

←

←

←

8

↑

←

↑

←

7

↑

←

←

←

5

←

←

↑

←

←

←

←

1

↑
↑

OUT
7
5

IN
0
1

Δ
7
4

↑

←

3

3

0

↑

↑

3

3

0

←

3

3

0

←

1

4

-3

←

1

4

-3

←

1

6

-5

4

5

6

7

8

←

↑
↑

↑
↑

↑
↑

←

←

↑

↑

↑

←

←

Tentative SID Assignments
By arranging the affinities in descending order of “delta”, tentative SID positions
for the affinities were then assigned in Table 16, the Tentative SID Assignments Table.
The delta values provide a proxy of the relative “weight of influence” of one affinity
toward all the others within the system. The Primary Driver (many Outs, but no Ins) is
named as such because it has considerable influence on the other affinities, but is not
affected by the other affinities. The Secondary Driver (more Outs than Ins) have a
relative influence on other affinities, as well as from other affinities within the system.
Essentially, the Secondary Driver was not as influential on the other affinities as the
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Primary Driver, but was still a relatively strong force for influence toward other affinities
compared to how many other affinities’ affect it.
Pivots (Outs equals Ins; i.e., delta equals zero) are just that – a “pivot point” from
which other affinities’ influence fed back or are involved with many affinities
concurrently. There were three pivots in this system; each pivot therefore had a
mathematically equal weight (in terms of delta) as far as their relative positions within the
system. To resolve this issue further, an examination of the pivot relationships illustrated
by the Tabular IRD of Affinity Relationship Table (Table 14) indicated that affinity #6
influenced affinity #8 (6 → 8), and 8 influenced 3 (3 ← 8). Because the 3 ← 6
relationship also conflicted with 3 → 6, the logical order of the pivots was resolved in
accordance with these issues as represented in the Tabular IRD – Sorted in Descending
Order Table (Table 15); the conflicts would subsequently be reconciled during the
construction of the final SID.
Table 16. Tentative SID Assignments Table
Tentative SID Assignments
#
4

Affinity Name
Organizational Context

Location/Assignment
Primary Driver

2

Personal Impact/Outcome

Secondary Driver

6

Expectations

Pivot

8

Security of Technology

Pivot

3

Complexity

Pivot

7

Vicarious Experience/3rd-Party Influence

Secondary Outcome

5

Security of the Channel

Secondary Outcome

1

Credibility

Secondary Outcome
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The Secondary Outcomes (more Ins than Outs) were the result of the relative
influence of many more of the stronger affinities while still maintaining some degree of
influence on the other affinities. A Primary Outcome is an affinity affected by other
affinities but does not itself influence any other affinities in the system. Results indicated
there were no Primary Outcomes (many Ins, but no Outs) in the constituents’ system of
perception and experience; each affinity had an affect on at least one other in the system.
Constructing the System Influence Diagram
The first step to constructing the SID was to organize the affinities in order of
relative position according to the Tentative SID Assignments Table. Arrows were drawn
as links between affinities to represent the influence between affinity-pair relationships as
indicated in the Tabular IRD of Affinity Relationships Table (relationships inside the
dotted triangle in Table 14). Figure 3, known as a Cluttered SID, illustrates the outcome
of this process.
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Figure 3. Cluttered SID
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The Cluttered SID represents all the affinity-pair relationships that survived the
Min/Max criterion but is generally too complex and intricate to be a very useful
representation of an abstract system due to redundant links between the affinities; hence,
redundancies were systematically removed. The process of removing redundant links was
based on delta and SID assignments whereby direct links between affinities from the
extreme left (drivers) to the extreme right (outcomes) are removed if another indirect path
still provides the requisite connection between the two affinities. In other words, a direct
link between the highest and lowest delta-assigned affinities was removed only if there
was an alternative path (the path did not need to be a direct link) between the two
affinities. For example, as depicted in Figure 4, the direct 4 → 1 link is removed because
we can still depict the meaningful connection/influence of 4 → 1 by retaining the
linkages between 4 → 2 → 1).
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Figure 4. Removing a Redundant Link
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The process continued until all redundancies were removed. The outcome of this
process was the Uncluttered SID. At this time, the conflicts noted from Table 13 were
added back into the graphical system prior to a final simplification and removal of
remaining redundancies. Figure 5 depicts the Uncluttered SID with conflicts represented
by arrows with dashed lines. Again, redundancies were removed via the same
simplification process previously described.
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Figure 5. Uncluttered SID with Conflicts Added

The Final SID
Figure 6 represents the Final SID with all redundant linkages removed between
system affinities. Although both the Pareto Cumulative Frequency and Power Analysis
Table (Table 12) and the Cluttered SID (Figure 3) could just as well represent the system,
the Final SID provides a parsimonious conceptual model of the problem/phenomenon as
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it exists in the minds of the focus group constituents. The next chapter will discuss
significant aspects of the Final SID as well as some observations and analyses associated
with the system.
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CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Discussion
Based on the IQA methodology, a focus group constituency of 15 military IT
professionals provided their individual perceptions, experiences, and beliefs in regards to
what makes each of them suspicious of IT. Through group consensus-building, the
constituents provided eight affinities or elements of suspicion and provided their
individual notions of the means by which each element influenced the others. The
resultant system of experience and perception provides a theoretically compelling
foundation from which to explore the nature of IT suspicion because it was envisioned by
those who are arguably close to the problem or phenomenon. Additional discussion
regarding the nature of the final system is provided in the following sections with
particular emphasis on certain noteworthy aspects of the system affinities and
relationships.
Affinity-Pair Influence Relationships
Organizational Context Influence
Analysis clearly indicated Organizational Context was perceived as “most
responsible” for all subsequent perceptions, experiences, and interpretations associated
with all the other things that make us suspicious of IT. As depicted in the Final SID,
Organizational Context was the primary driver of the system. Upon reflection, the
“essence” of the constituents’ themes and meanings associated with Organizational
Context seemed to mirror the structural mechanisms of Adaptive Structuration Theory
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(AST) (DeSanctis and Poole, 1994). According to DeSanctis and Poole, “AST focuses on
social structures, rules and resources provided by technologies and institutions as the
basis for human activity.” (p. 125). One such structure is provided by the organizational
environment (Ibid.); hence, the basis for this discussion. It is reasonable to conclude
within the context of an organization like the Air Force, with so many embedded,
ingrained, explicit, and implicit organizational influences, that members’ actions,
perceptions, and experiences are highly influenced by that organizational environment.
Indeed, it is the nature of the military, as an institution of traditions, high standards, and
professionalism that creates a culture of conformity to rules and regulations; therefore,
the contextual structures (such as the focus group’s “policies”) of this particular
organization naturally exerted a strong influence on the focus members’ actions and
thought processes.
AST also suggests that IT provides social structures in the form of structural
features (i.e., the rules, resources, and capabilities) and a spirit (i.e., the general intent or
use) underlying the features of a system (DeSanctis and Poole, 1994). The appropriation
or adaptation of social structures by organizational members influences the way in which
members identify with and implement such structures. Hence, contextual structures can
also inform which IT structures or spirit is appropriated. The structures inherent of the
organization, whether they were the technology, policies, management decisions, or the
culture of the organization strongly impacted user perceptions of the IT used in the
organization. In this light, Organizational Context provides for perceptual mechanisms
similar to those described for situationally-aroused suspicion (Levine and McCornack,
1991; Fogg and Tseng, 1999) because the context of the Air Force organization
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essentially was the situation/environment in which the constituents’ suspicion of IT
would be aroused.
The notion of a suspicious predisposition is also a relevant facet of the
organizational context as described the focus group. As mentioned in the literature
review, Generalized Technology Suspicion (GTS) is similar to Levine and McCornack’s
(1991) Generalized Communicative Suspicion (GCS). Recall that GCS is an inherent
belief that all incoming communication behaviors from others are deceptive (Ibid.),
whereas GTS is a perception that there is reason to be suspicious of all technology.
Although, not all people are predisposed to GTS, it does imply a general assumption
people make about technology (Fogg and Tseng, 1999). In the case of this research, the
fact that the constituents were IT professionals in the Air Force may have attributed to a
generalized predisposition toward GTS (Conti et al., 2005; Hollebeek and Waltzman,
2004). Indeed, the constituents’ knowledge and training of IT security and defense of
military networks, and the fact they were all students of a graduate program for which
topics such as IT security vulnerabilities are discussed and researched, likely contributed
to such a predisposition. Further discussion of the impact/influence that the
Organizational Context has on the other affinities is provided in several of the individual
affinity discussions that follow.
Personal Impact/Outcome Influence
The Final SID revealed Personal Impact/Outcome as a having a relatively strong
influence on the other affinities, as opposed to the other affinities influence on it – with
the exception of the previously discussed Organizational Context. Hence, constituents
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felt their personal experiences had a strong impact on their perceptions of the IT they
have used. It is not surprising that first-hand ‘experience’ is an influential element of the
system because it solidifies a person’s perceptions via repeated interactions with IT (Fogg
and Tseng, 1999). The Organizational Context was certainly an influence on the
constituents’ inputs for this affinity. Indeed, the personal experiences of the constituents
could have come from experiences outside of work; however, evaluation of the reported
data on the ARTs revealed a majority of constituent inputs were derived from personal
impact and experiences generated in the workplace. For example, the failure of
implementing a new system led to the loss of an individual’s work-related data in which
he had invested a great deal of time and effort.
Expectations
Several inputs regarding personal experiences were quite similar and indicated a
general tendency towards negative rather than positive experiences and perceptions.
Therefore, findings suggest negative user experiences with IT lead to IT suspicion. The
basis for this finding seems to stem from the notion that experiences lead to general
expectations (Muir, 1987). Hence, the Personal Impact/Outcome → Expectations
relationship aligns with the findings of previous studies (Muir, 1987; Fogg and Tseng,
1999; Flechais et al., 2006).
It was also clear from constituent inputs that they were referring to expectations
they had about the technology per se as opposed to expectations of information residing
on the technology or the use of technological communications channels. Specifically,
constituents noted that reliability and predictability of technology, such as a computer,
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resulted in generalized expectations of how a computer should behave. Furthermore, the
negative connotation of the overall constituency’s inputs indicated that certain
expectations are user-established standards and that only when deviations to user
expectations occur would a user become suspicious of the technology.
Security of the Technology
Constituents noted their experiences led to general expectations such as reliability
and predictability of IT. Closely related to the general expectations reported above (and
an affinity that could potentially be generalized as a user expectation in its own right) is
the Security of the Technology. Constituent inputs indicated that user expectations of
security issues are extremely important and that technology in general was perceived or
experienced as not fully secure. Specifically, the constituents referred to the Security of
the Technology affinity as the “lack of” security, and that this lack of security invoked
suspicion. Hence, constituent expectations were that the security aspects of technology
are generally deficient. Again, the Organizational Context was found to influence this
affinity as the nature of the constituents’ studies and research, which included topics
pertaining to security issues with IT, undoubtedly affected their perceptions (or
expectations) regarding IT security in general, as well as simply a general increase in the
awareness of IT-security related issues.
Complexity
Perceptions and experiences regarding Security of the Technology influenced the
way constituents thought about the Complexity of IT. Recall from the previous chapter’s
discussion about complexity that difficulties in usage were directly related to the overall
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complexity of a piece of IT. The previously discussed elements of suspicion such as
dispositional inferences, uncertainty, and self-efficacy certainly seemed to be at the heart
of this relationship.
For example, constituents posited that the complexity of the technology actually
affected the usability of the system. However, usability of a technology is a perception
generated via a dispositional inference made on the technology (Murphy et al, 2003;
Rozanski and Haake, 2003); hence, it stood to reason that some constituents expressed
the fact that “if I think a technology is too complex, then I will avoid using it.” Another
aspect of this relationship was that notion that security added an element of uncertainty to
the technology where all features or characteristics of the security may be unknown to the
user. Such uncertainty may further be responsible for the contributions of self-efficacy
perceptions to IT suspicion. Specifically, in the face of additional security features that
increase the complexity of a piece of technology, the mounting uncertainty would prompt
a user to question his/her knowledge and abilities. As Gross and Rosson (2007) observed,
perceptions of self-efficacy can contribute to overall suspicion.
Security of the Channel
Recall that the original “Privacy” affinity seemed to center on the more general
notion of Security of the Channel upon which information was sent, including such
subjects as online transactions and the use of various channels such as the Internet, cell
phones, email, and instant messaging for conducting such transactions. Hence,
information security was an essential part of this category because the lack of security of
the channel may lead to manipulated or lost information. As indicated in the literature
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review, the media used in communication intensifies our concerns about the integrity of
the channel (Riegelsberger, et al., 2005). These concerns about the Security of the
Channel therefore result in user suspicion of the channel (Shechtman and Horowitz,
2003). Indeed, Constituents expressed their doubts when it came to the security of the
technologies used to communicate information while blaming IT companies for
providing defective products and services. Therefore, user perceptions of the Security of
the Channel were clearly influenced by notions of Credibility because constituents felt IT
companies do not provide for a degree of security in their products and services that users
expect in order to protect one’s privacy.
Further Analysis and Abstractions
External Influence Affinity
During the process of analyzing and interpreting the model it became clear that
the Vicarious Experience/3rd Party Impact and Credibility relationships were tightly
coupled, perhaps even elements of the same larger affinity or concept. The underlying
principle for this assertion is the notion of external influence on a user. External influence
comes from information provided via a third-party; however, as discussed in the literature
review, third-party information is also subject to a credibility judgment by the user of
such information (Fogg and Tseng, 1999). Essentially, a credibility judgment can be
influenced externally by third-party information – exactly the relationship articulated here
in the final model of IT suspicion. Certainly, third-party information could come directly
from other users, TV, radio, and websites to mention a few; however, users may also
experience such information vicariously. For example, constituents did not personally
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experience unsafe events as a result of using IT; thus, their notion of “safety” as it related
to IT suspicion was actually based on the vicarious experiences and reports of others.
In addition, the companies responsible for IT themselves may be a source of
external influence through their reputation, products and services. From a social context,
a credibility judgment is an evaluation of another person’s trustworthiness (Burgoon et
al., 1996). Constituents seemed to apply this rule to IT companies whereby constituents
felt the Credibility of IT companies affected their perceptions of those companies’
products and services. The literature review suggested that a user’s perceived suspicion
of the source (i.e., an IT company or other users) affects the perceived credibility of the
information provided by that source (Ibid.). Hence, credibility and suspicion mutually
affect each other.
In light of these observations, the Vicarious Experience/3rd Party Impact affinity
was combined with the Credibility affinity to form a conceptually more complex but still
meaningful (in terms of the original two affinities) External Influence affinity. The
rationale for this decision was grounded in the various concepts and issues discussed in
the literature review, as well as the findings themselves. In particular, suspicion may be
influenced by negative information from third-parties. However, third-party information
must be provided by credible sources – at least credible as perceived by the user.
Credibility is an evaluation of trustworthiness and expertise (Fogg & Tseng, 1999). In
this case, the perceived trustworthiness and expertise of IT companies, their products and
services, affected a company’s reputation – in other words, a credibility judgment (Ibid.).
A modified version of the Final SID is depicted in Figure 7 which incorporates
this affinity-pair abstraction. Note that that the general proximity and connectivity
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between the remaining system affinities has not been altered; however, by representing
the tight coupling and conceptual overlap of the two affinities into a single, more
meaningful affinity, the model itself is actually more informative in light of existing
suspicion theory and research. A miniature graphic of the Final SID is provided to
illustrate the difference between the Final SID and the Modified Final SID.
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Figure 7. Modified Final SID

External Influence → Organizational Context
It was important to address the relationship between External Influence and
Organizational Context because this relationship essentially “closed the loop” on the
entire system of perception and experience regarding suspicion of IT. What this implied
is that such suspicion is not ultimately deterministic – experiences and perceptions of
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issues “downstream” in the system can in fact propagate their influence back through the
system to ultimately change or influence the perceptions and experiences of the various
“upstream” or driving issues associated with IT suspicion. In particular, the data
concerning the connections between affinity 7/1, External Influence and affinity 4,
Organizational Context, indicated a conflict; the constituents’ experiences and
perceptions between the two were therefore ambiguous and difficult to articulate
definitively in one direction or another.
On the one hand, Organizational Context was perceived to directly influence
perceptions of credibility in that constituents felt the organization they were part of
sometimes made decisions that conflicted with user needs, perceptions, and expectations.
Constituent inputs suggested policies that led to either extreme constraint or an
overreaction to adapt or use IT (such as the example provided regarding the
implementation of a redundant system). However, it was also the case that experiences
and perceptions of credibility, which were primarily the culmination of the impacts and
influences from all the other factors in the system, could still impact or alter the nature
and perceptions of the clearly influential organizational context. For instance, IT
companies want to establish credibility for themselves, and the way they do this is to
provide products and services that will provide positive user experiences (Binstock,
1999). Although this suggests an example of an organization outside of a user’s
immediate context or workplace, the same holds true for a user’s organization in attempts
to establish member credibility within the organization. Hence, the credibility established
within an organization facilitates positive user perceptions of the context of the
organization (such as the way it implements its IT policies).
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This final feedback loop that interconnects all the factors within the system
suggests that AST-like mechanisms of enforcement and reinforcement were at work in
the minds and experiences of the constituents in relation to suspicion of IT. For example,
the appropriation of certain social structures (i.e., structural features and spirit) clearly
influenced user experiences and expectations of IT within the context of use (DeSanctis
and Poole, 1994). However, constituent inputs suggested that conflicts exist between user
needs and corporate or organizational interests indicating a potential mismatch of these
structures or the possibility of misappropriating the structures inherent in IT for use
within the organizational context. The result of these experiences and potential
misappropriations (such as constituent concerns with organizational policies) could thus
feed back to affect changes in the Organizational Context in such a way that user
attitudes and adoption of the technology were altered again.
Ambiguous Relationships
The type of relationship that exists when conflicts are not resolved is manifested
into what are referred to as Ambiguous Relationships (Turner, 2006). The Final SID
depicted two such relationships which were ultimately reconciled into a pair of Feedback
Loops. A simple version of this type of relationship with three affinities (it could be
more) is illustrated in Figure 8. What is interesting about this “loop” is the fact that
several arguments could be made as far as which affinity influences another. For
example, if an argument exists that C → A, then one would indicate A influences B, and
B influences C; hence, A indirectly influences C (through B). Therefore, if B is removed
from the system, then the C → A and A → C affinity-pair relationships are essentially
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equally supported hypotheses (Ibid.). Thus, the feedback loops are useful representations
of ambiguity of thought on the part of the constituents because they allow us to articulate
a situation in which experiences or perceptions of one affinity both influence, and are
influenced by, other affinities within the same system.

Figure 8. Sample Feedback Loop (Source: Turner, 2006)

The Modified Final SID (Figure 7) illustrates that a Feedback Loop existed among
the Complexity, Expectations, and Security of the Technology affinities. These three
affinities were also Pivots within the model as illustrated in the Tabular IRD of Affinity
Relationships (Table 14). Pivots are essentially a “pivot point” from which other
affinities’ influence within the system feed back, into, or involve many other affinities
concurrently. These three affinities, because their deltas each equaled zero, had equal
weight as far as their position to each other within the system. Examination of the content
and nature of the relationships between the affinities themselves indicated that this
feedback loop centered on constituents’ perceptions of suspicion directly relative to the
“technology.” Hence, it appeared constituents found it difficult to distinguish which
element (i.e., expectations, security of the technology and the complexity of technology)
invoked a higher degree of suspicion.
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Another Feedback Loop existed among Complexity, External Influence, and
Security of the Channel affinities. Examination of these affinities revealed that elements
of third-party and technological influence were also common to each. For instance, it was
previously discussed that information from third-parties may lead to suspicion of IT. The
complexity and security of the technology or the channel may also lead to lost,
manipulated, or simply wrong information. Hence, information from third-parties may
not be accurate which would then lead a user to become suspicious of the information.
Credibility judgments are also difficult to render when the channel from which the
information was communicated is suspected to have inadequate security.
Interestingly, Complexity links the two inner feedback loops together.
Constituents defined complexity on the basis of an IT systems’ level of difficulty to
implement or use; therefore, complexity denotes a user’s uncertainty about a technology.
Literature suggests that uncertainty is an element of suspicion (Kee and Knox, 1970) and
that those users who lack the complete knowledge and experiences of an IT system are
uncomfortable about using it (de Vries et al., 2003); these same connections were
apparent in the constituent inputs. A person’s own perceptions about his/her own abilities
(i.e., self-efficacy) also affect his/her perceptions about the complexity of technology
(Compeau et al., 1999); again as one individual indicated, “If it’s too difficult, then I
probably won’t use it.”
Simplifying the Model
By continuing the logic presented in the discussions above concerning the
multiple individual affinity-pair relationships and feedback loops, a further simplification
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and abstraction of the system became evident. As depicted in Figure 9, four conceptual
zones related to suspicion of IT are proposed. The name given to each zone reflects its
general theme or meaning. Connections made to the suspicion process in the
aforementioned literature review are provided in the separate discussions of each zone.
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Figure 9. SID with Four Zones
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Situational/Environmental Zone
Organizational Context and Personal Impact/Outcome are included in this zone.
In comparing the relationship between these affinities it was evident that the situation or
environment a user was part of had a considerable impact on whether a user became
suspicious of IT. Hence, the elements of suspicion indicative of this zone seemed to
mirror the issues associated with Situationally-Aroused suspicion as discussed in the
literature review. It was no surprise that the constituents, because they were all IT
professionals in the military, were affected by the situation/environment they were
subject to. However, the situation/environment also facilitated a users’ ability to obtain
unique experiences such as defending an organizational network, or managing
information systems.
Personal Experience Zone
Personal Impact/Outcome and Expectations were part of this zone because
experiences lead to the development or reinforcement of various expectations. As
suggested from the previous literature review, Expectations are a principle element of
suspicion (Binstock, 1999; Bottitta and Felici, 2006; Burgoon et al., 1996; Bradley, 1998;
Flechais et al., 2006; Muir, 1987). However, a user’s actual experiences with IT
eventually lead to a level of general expectation of the technology (Muir, 1987; Fogg and
Tseng, 1999; Flechais et al., 2006). Constituents felt that the reliability and predictability
of a system was important, because it offered a level of comfort for them from which
they could base subsequent perceptions of that system’s trustworthiness. Individuals
noted their bad experiences, such as “bugs in operating systems” and “excessive
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downtime due to a failure in the system” to mention a few. The negative connotation of
the constituent inputs suggests that deviations to user expectations of the technology lead
to user suspicion of that technology – an observation previously discussed.
Technology Influence Zone
Expectations, Security of the Technology, and Complexity each referred to the
subject “Technology” in the minds of the constituents. These three affinities were subject
to a series of ambiguous relationships that ultimately formed a feedback loop. Hence,
each affinity had an equal weight of influence on the other within the system. It is within
this feedback loop that the suspicion elements of expectations, dispositional inferences,
uncertainty, and self-efficacy are likely responsible for the many perceptions and
experiences associated with these ambiguous relationships. Most significant to discuss
within this zone is the Complexity affinity, because it essentially tied the two previously
mentioned feedback loops in the system.
In particular, constituents felt that IT that is difficult to use constitutes user
perceptions of the complexity of the technology. Hence, constituents not knowingly
mentioned that they were essentially making a dispositional inference toward the
technology. Some individuals went as far as to say that if the technology looked complex
then it probably was, and that it would discourage users from adapting that technology.
However, the majority of constituent inputs suggested that a “learning curve” exists
especially when it comes to new technology – an example provided by the group was the
excessively large user manuals that accompany many IT products. Therefore, constituents
expressed their notions of uncertainty of the IT based on their abilities to comprehend all
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the intricacies that are inherent of an IT system; hence, the argument of self-efficacy
comes into play.
Third-Party Influence Zone
The Third-Party Influence Zone included Complexity, Security of the Channel,
and the combined affinity External Influence. Similar to the Technology Influence Zone,
the affinities in the Third-Party Influence Zone were comprised of ambiguous
relationships that formed a feedback loop. What this suggested was that third-party
information can come from many different sources including other users, TV, radio, and
websites just to name a few; and that such information could also come indirectly or
vicariously from these same sources. As mentioned in the literature review, third-party
information can arouse user suspicion (Stiff et al., 1992) and that the aroused suspicion
can be increased or decreased by further interaction. However, a user must determine
credibility of the information or the source, even when there are questions that arise
regarding the security of the communications channel used to convey the information.
Both of these factors were found to further fuel one’s perceptions and experiences of
Complexity.
Interpretation of the Final Model
So what does suspicion of IT look like? The Simplified Final SID represents a
cognitive model of the IT suspicion process and may be implemented as such. In relating
the model to the concepts from the literature review, each of the four zones represents an
axis for initiating or resolving a suspended judgment. This research demonstrated that
suspicion of IT truly is a complex process and the system model has provided greater
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fidelity as to what specific issues are considered or negotiated; and how, as the suspicion
process plays out. To clarify this point, a brief review of the suspicion process is
necessary. First, the suspicion process involves a suspended judgment and the final
outcome of this judgment is a decision to trust or not to trust (i.e., a trust-decision). The
suspended judgment is resolved through a process consisting of three sequential stages:
categorization, characterization, and correction (Gilbert et al, 1988). These three stages
are respectively summarized and defined as identify, anchor, and adjust. Therefore,
within the model obtained in this study, each zone represents a cognitive subject area in
which a suspended judgment about IT occurs. More specifically, each zone indicates an
area for which an IT user makes a trust-decision.
Based on the degree of influence and interconnection as depicted by the model,
each zone must also be resolved prior to moving on to the next, though the resolution of
issues in a subsequent zone may feed back to impact or change perceptions and
experiences about prior issues that will further influence trust-decisions. Within each
zone are the affinities or suspicion elements from which a user identifies, anchors, and
adjusts his decision. For example, in the Situational/Environmental Zone, a suspended
judgment would take into account both Personal Impact/Outcome and Organizational
Context in making a trust-decision. As one would expect, a military member who is an IT
professional and perhaps working in area of network defense would be more susceptible
to suspicion because he/she is highly influenced by the nature of his/her job. However,
the Personal Experience Zone is also an area of suspended judgment connected to the
Situational/Environmental Zone. Hence, the system identifies that these two zones are
highly coupled.
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Interestingly, both the Technology and Third-Party Influence Zones are
representative of ambiguous relationships. The reason why the suspicion process involves
a wealth of cognitive resources is because of the constant anchoring and adjusting of
multiple hypotheses as was mentioned in the literature review discussion (Fein, 1996;
Fein et al., 1990; Hilton et al., 1993; Gilbert et al., 1988; Tversky and Kahneman, 1974;
Quattrone, 1982). In reference to the suspicion process, these ambiguous relationships,
and the even more compelling overall feedback loop of the system, represents the
additional complexities involved in resolving a suspended judgment, and can illustrate or
account for how and why one might remain in a state of suspended judgment without
ever reaching a resolution. For these reasons, the suspicion process associated with IT
may not always be a quick decision; it may last a relatively long time based on the
difficulties a user encounters with the numerous suspended judgment processes a user
must cognitively overcome to make a final trust-decision.
Limitations and Recommendations for Future Research
A limitation to this study exists in the selection of the focus group members,
specifically the representative size and demographics. Specifically, a focus group was
used to obtain the data from constituents who, according to the principle researcher, are
closest to the problem/phenomenon. However, the overriding research question for this
study was: What is the nature of user suspicion toward IT? The question implied a broad
population of IT users; therefore, the relatively narrow sampling of focus group
participants in this study may not represent the perceptions, realities, or lived experiences
of an entire population of IT users. The cognitive dimension of the information
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environment is a critical area of research in light of the increasing use of IT in the
military and globally.
Hence, although this study created a model indicative of perceptions and
experiences of some IT professionals, it would be interesting and theoretically relevant to
obtain results from a constituency of typical IT users. Perhaps studies focusing on gender
or cultural differences would create a different model as well. However, to truly obtain
results of a majority population, a larger and more diverse constituency should facilitate a
representative model of the typical IT user. Furthermore, a more inclusive IQA approach
to include interviews or perhaps multiple focus groups would create a more robust data
set than that obtained for the current research.
Clearly, Organizational Context was the primary influence on the rest of the
system. Perhaps a non-military constituency of IT professionals who were not managers
per se would not be as strongly influenced by the context of their organization? Would
non-professional users of IT even conceive the notion of an organizational context? If
not, then what would become the primary driver in the system? Another limitation to this
study is that the model may not reflect the system as it pertains to specific IT jobs or
tasks. For example, a group of network security professionals may have a different
mental model when compared to a software engineer or interface designer. Perhaps a
group of computer scientists and engineers would mirror a system in which Complexity
would not be part of a feedback loop. A potentially more intriguing recommendation for
future research takes this notion of suspicion and examines it from the attackers’ vantage
point…what would the system look like for a group of computer hackers?
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More specific concerns in the execution of the methodology included the room in
which the focus group was held and the time allocated for the meeting. During the
meeting, some constituents expressed their dissatisfaction with the temperature of the
room; however, temperature controls were not available. It is possible that physical
discomfort on the part of some participants have led to the precipitous naming of the
affinities or axial coding, and even more so the theoretical coding of affinity-pairs to
establish influence relationships, which was the last task the constituents were asked to
do. The time allocated as addressed to the focus group prior to the meeting was 2 ½
hours. Although the meeting lasted a little over 2 hours, perhaps if the constituents were
told 3 hours, they would have allocated more time in their busy schedules and not have
felt rushed, especially toward the end of the meeting when the theoretical coding task
was accomplished.
Finally, a modified version of the IQA methodology was implemented such that
the sole use of the focus group was employed for collection of data. In a more typical
IQA study, individual interviews with constituents are conducted some time after the
focus group whereby further examination and interpretation of the affinities and the
theoretical coding is accomplished to better understand the nature and contents of the
obtained system (Turner, 2006). In the course of this research, examination and follow-up
interpretation of the data was conducted by the principle researcher only, thus introducing
the possibility of researcher bias in the construction and interpretation of the resultant
affinities and system of perception and experience.
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Implications for the Air Force
The implications of this study and resultant system of IT suspicion may be used as
a conceptual framework from which a robust IT suspicion model or training paradigm
could be developed and implemented by organizations as part of their network protection
practices or Information Assurance programs. Certainly, the Situational/Environmental
Zone is a significant portion of the model, because it includes the primary and secondary
drivers of the system. Hence, the context of the organization should focus on the needs of
the user to ensure the structures in the organization relevant to the use of IT are
appropriated correctly. A level of agreement between users and management in the
appropriation of structures inherent to IT and the organizational environment should also
facilitate IT use; thus providing the necessary user experiences to encourage further use
and development of positive affect and perceptions surrounding the IT itself.
The Technology Influence Zone is also an area for which training should focus.
The model indicates that Complexity is important because it is a central link between the
two ambiguous relationships. Complexity is an issue central to users’ concerns about IT
and thus within their suspicion process. The importance of this linkage suggests that by
eliminating or at least decreasing perceptions of IT complexity, a user’s suspicion process
of resolving a suspended judgment might facilitate a quicker trust-decision. The
implication of such gains in resolution speed suggest that complexity is a key
consideration in creating a more effective and rapid OODA loop than that of our
adversaries (AFDD 2-5; Gibb, 2000). It is likely that adequate training and hands-on
experience would mitigate a user’s uncertainty about technology and provide for greater
confidence about IT necessary to make quicker and better decisions.
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Furthermore, the Technology Influence Zone indicates that users’ expectations and
experiences are that the technology is not secure and that it is very complex. This area of
the model suggests that training of IT users for the purposes of detecting of deception or
attempts to hack into our computers and networks should focus on both the securityrelated issues of the technology as well as demystifying the complexity of the technology
itself. Such training should also focus on the issues associated with the Third-Party
Influence Zone. For instance, a general awareness of the security issues surrounding
various communication channels (Security of the Channel) were observed to be key to the
processes by which users become suspicious of IT; focus on such issues may perhaps
sensitize users to better detect computer and network attacks.
Conclusion
The purpose of this study was to address the problem/phenomenon of IT user
suspicion and to answer the question at the heart of this investigation: What is the nature
of user suspicion toward IT? The IQA methodology allowed for a flexible but disciplined
approach to generating and analyzing data appropriate for answering that research
question. The results of this study show that user suspicion toward IT is a very complex
cognitive process that exists in the minds of IT users. However, analysis also showed that
a user’s situation or environment vastly affects the outcome of his/her suspicion process.
In addition, a user’s personal experiences, third-party information, and the technology
itself can affect a user’s suspicion process. The obtained model of IT suspicion also
illustrates the complexities and connections between the psycho-social and technologyrelated perspectives of suspicion, suggesting that the nature of suspicion toward IT is
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indeed rooted in the same interpersonal suspicion mechanisms and processes inherent in
social interactions.
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